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AIRCRAFT NOISE REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: THE HUSHKIT PROBLEM
BENEDICTE A. CLAES* ** 1
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE AVIATION industry has changed tremendously since
the seventies. The doubling in air traffic volume coupled
with increased airport congestion awakened the aviation indus-
try to the adverse impact of aviation on the environment. Emis-
sions of pollutants, such as hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide,
and nitrogen oxide, and increasing noise pollution in the vicin-
ity of airports represent the clearest examples of how air traffic
threatens the environment.2
Simultaneously, national and international bodies realized
the limits of total trade liberalization and recognized the impor-
tance of protecting the environment. Both within the former
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") framework
* At the time this article was written, the author was a graduate student at the
Georgetown University Law Center, where she completed a Masters degree in
Common Law Studies (LL.M.). Cum Laude. Before attending the Georgetown
University Law Center, the author worked as a trainee at the European Commis-
sion and as an associate at the law firm of Van Bael & Bellis, Brussels, Belgium.
The author also completed a Masters degree in European Community Law
(LL.M.) at the College of Europe, Bruges and a "Licentiaat in de Rechten"
Magna Cum Laude at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. The views
expressed here are exclusively those of the author.
** Please be aware that this article is up-to-date as of the end of March 2000.
Because this is a continually changing area of law, portions of this article may
require updating.
I The author wishes to thank Professor Allan I. Mendelsohn, Professor Warren
L. Dean, Jr., Ms. Heather L. Miller, and Mr. Ignacio L6pez de Romafia for their
helpful comments. This article also benefits from discussions with Monique
Tousseyn and Laurent Muschel of the Transport Directorate of the European
Commission, Nathalie Marchioro of ACI-Europe, and Richard Marchi of ACI-
North America. The views expressed, however, are exclusively those of the
author.
2 See Robert V. Garvin, Aircraft Engines and the Environment: Cleaner and Quieter is
the Promise of the Nineties, in AIR TRANSPORT AND POLICY IN THE 1990s 53, 53-60
(Pablo Mendes de Leon ed., 1991).
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and the current World Trade Organization ("WTO") structure,
policymakers increasingly consider environmental issues.
In response to the growing willingness to prioritize the main-
tenance of a sound environment for present and future genera-
tions,4 the aviation industry was adamant about addressing these
poignant "aviation-induced" environmental problems within the
framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization
("ICAO").
Notwithstanding the actions taken by ICAO to address the
problem of aircraft engine noise by adopting international noise
standards in Volume I of Annex 16 to the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation ("Chicago Convention"),' the growing
noise pollution around Community airports prompted the Eu-
ropean Union ("EU") 6 to take even more stringent measures.
In April 1998, the Commission of the European Union7 sub-
mitted a proposal' for a regulation aimed at precluding certain
certificated aircraft from serving Community airports as of April
3 "The Preamble to the WTO Agreement includes direct references to the ob-
jective of sustainable development and the need to protect and preserve the envi-
ronment. The new Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT
Agreement") and on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures take explicitly into ac-
count the use of governments of measures to protect human, animal and plant
life and health and the environment." See Background to WTO work on the
trade and environment (visited Mar. 14, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/wto/envi-
ron/backgrou.htm>.
4 Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration provides: "The right to development must
be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of
present and future generations." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, 14June 1992, adopted 14June 1992, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
5 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter "Chicago Convention"].
6 The European Union was formally created by the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU), agreed and signed on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on
November 1, 1993. The Union has a tripartite structure: (1) the three European
Communities (the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, and the European Atomic Energy Community), (2) the Common and For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP), and (3) the Co-operation in the field of Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA).
7 The European Commission is generally regarded as "the executive branch"
of the European Community and fulfils three major functions: (1) participation
in policy making by the Council (possessing the right of initiative to propose new
legislation), (2) administrative function, and (3) supervisory function.
8 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Registration and Op-
eration within the Community of Certain Types of Civil Subsonic Jet Aeroplanes
Which Have Been Modified and Recertificated as Meeting the Standards of Vol-
ume I, Part II, Chapter 3 of Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, 3d ed. (July 1993), 1998 O.J. (C 118) 20 and 1998 O.J. (C 329) 10.
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1, 2002. The types of aircraft targeted are older aircraft that
have been "recertificated" to comply with the noise standards of
Chapter 39 of Volume I of Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention.
Recertificated aircraft includes hushkitted aircraft, aircraft that
meet the Chapter 3 standard through operational restrictions
(weight restrictions or reduced flap settings), and aircraft re-en-
gined with an engine that has a bypass ratio ("BPR") 10 lower
than 3.11
On April 29, 1999, the Council of the European Union
adopted the Regulation (the "Regulation")12 but indicated that
it would "postpone the date of application of the Regulation by
one year in order to facilitate the continuation and the conclu-
sion of the consultations with the United States.' ' 3
The Regulation subjects aircraft registered in an EU Member
State to the non-addition rule. This rule prohibits Member
States from adding recertificated aircraft to their registers as of
May 4, 2000. Nevertheless, an aircraft registered in any Member
State before May 4, 2000, which has been registered in the Com-
munity ever since, will not be affected by the non-addition
rule. 14 EU aircraft can also be added to another EU Member
State's registry while non-EU aircraft cannot.
In addition, the Regulation introduces a non-operation rule,
aimed both at EU and third country carriers. Under the non-
operation rule, re-certificated aircraft are prohibited from oper-
ating in the territory of the Community as of April 1, 2002, un-
less they meet two conditions. These conditions require the
operator of an airplane to prove (1) that the plane was on the
9 "Chapter 2" and "Chapter 3" are the ICAO terms used outside the United
States while "Stage 2" and "Stage 3" are terms used by the United States and both
essentially refer to the same principles.
10 "Bypass ratio" (BPR) is an expression that relates the total mass of air drawn
into the engine to that portion of air that is used in the energy-release process of
burning fuel in the high-pressure core of the engine.
11 See Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 925/1999 of 29 April 1999
on the Registration and Operation Within the Community of Certain Types of
Civil Subsonic Jet Aeroplanes Which Have Been Modified and Recertificated as
Meeting the Standards of Volume I, Part II, Chapter 3 of Annex 16 to the Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation, 3d ed. (July 1993) 1999 O.J. (L 120) 46,
Art. 2.2 [hereinafter "Regulation"].
12 See id.
1s Statement by the Council and the Commission joined to the Regulation,
adopted during the Industry Council on April 29, 1999 (visited Mar. 14, 2000)
<http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main.cfm?LANG=l> (This statement can be found
by searching for "hushkit." Currently listed as "2174.COUNCIL-INDUSTRY.").
14 See Regulation, Art. 3.2, supra note 11, at 49.
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register of that third country on May 4, 2000, and (2) that it
operated in the Community between April 1, 1995, and May 4,
2000.15 To put EU aircraft at the same level as third country
aircraft, Article 3.4 imposes the same non-operation obligation
on EU aircraft.
The EU believes that the older planes, originally certificated
to meet the Chapter 2 standard and modified to improve their
noise certification level, not only cause more noise pollution but
also cause more gaseous emissions,' 6 and consume more fuel 17
than modern aircraft originally certificated to meet the Chapter
3 standard.18
The growth of civil aviation in Europe 19 depends upon the
aviation industry's ability to progressively reduce the noise of
each individual aircraft movement since almost every airport in
Europe is at full noise capacity.20 Recertificated aircraft dispro-
portionately increase the cumulative noise load around Commu-
nity airports and, accordingly, take up more noise capacity at
European airports than the modern "state of the art" aircraft.
By preventing the use of this older and noisier recertificated air-
craft after April 2002, the Regulation is believed to create addi-
tional growth opportunity for the aviation industry by freezing
the number of recertificated aircraft at their 2000 level. 21
The United States strongly opposes the Regulation claiming it
would discriminate against U.S. carriers, hushkit and engine
manufacturers, and cost the U.S. industry at least two billion dol-
lars.22 In particular, the United States Government argues that
hushkits reduce the noise emissions sufficiently and comply with
ICAO standards.
15 See Regulation, Art. 3.3, supra note 11, at 49.
16 See infra Part II.B.l.c.
17 See id.
18 See Regulation, Preamble 5, supra note 11, at 47.
19 See Assad Kotaite, Presentation by the President of the Council of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Dr. Assad Kotaite, of the Annual
Reports of the Council for 1995, 1996, 1997 and the Supplementary Report for
the First Six Months of 1998 During the 32nd Session of the Assembly (visited on
Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/a32pres-arsp.htm> (stating that the
ICAO member states' airlines are experiencing an average annual growth rate of
eight percent).
20 See ACI Europe, ACI Europe Position on Hushkitted Aircraft, Nov. 18, 1999.
21 See id.
22 See Congress Threatens No Stage 4 Agreement Unless EU Drops Hushkit Ban, AIR-
LINE FIN. NEWS, Sept. 27, 1999.
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For several months now, the United States has called on the
EU to rescind the hushkit Regulation. Failure to repeal the Reg-
ulation could lead not only to the ban of the non-Stage 3 Con-
corde23 but could also jeopardize further negotiations within
ICAO on the next generation of noise standards, the so-called
Chapter 4 standard, that would answer the long-term needs of
citizens who live near to airports. 24
On July 22, 1999, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution2 - to
push the U.S. State Department to lodge a complaint with ICAO
against the EU under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention so
that the top rulemaker in commercial aviation would rule on
whether the Regulation complies with international aviation
standards. 6 In addition, on September 23, 1999, the Aviation
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure drafted and approved a resolution 27 that reiter-
ates the Senate's resolution and threatens to stop working on
the establishment of a Stage 4 noise abatement standard if the
hushkit Regulation is not rescinded. 8
No major progress has been made during the last months of
1999 and the beginning of 2000. On the contrary, persistent in
their points of views, the parties seem to head straight for con-
flict. On several occasions the EU offered to postpone the May
4 deadline and delay the implementation of the Regulation un-
til at least September 2001, after the ICAO General Assembly, in
the hope that the United States will agree on the Chapter 4 stan-
dard which will render the EU hushkit Regulation obsolete. 29
Because the EU believes that it is very unlikely that the U.S. avia-
tion industry will be in favor of a new noise standard that is even
23 See H.R. 661, 106th Cong. (1999) (prohibiting the operation of the Con-
corde in the United States if the European Union does not rescind the hushkit
Regulation); see also Matthew Newman, EU Says Could Delay Ban On Aircraft "Hush
Kits", DOWJONEs NEws SERV., Oct. 7, 1999; Senate Wants ICAO to Rule on Validity of
Europe's Hushkit Ban, AVIATION DAILY, July 29, 1999, at 1.
24 See Paul Mann, U.S. May Up Hushkit Skirmish, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Jan. 1, 2000, at 30.
25 See Unanimous-Consent Agreement, Amendment No. 1342, 145 CONG. REc.
S9046, S9048 (1999).
26 See Senate Wants ICAO To Rule On Validity Of Europe's Hushkit Ban, AVIATION
DAILY, July 29, 1999, at 1.
27 See H. R. Con. Res. 187, 106th Cong. (1999).
28 See Congressional Committee Fires First Shot in Airport Noise Battle, WORLD AIR-
PORT WK., Sept. 28, 1999.
29 European Airports Champion Ban on Chapter 2 Aircraft, COMMUTER/REGIONAL
AIRLINE NEWS, Jan. 3, 2000.
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stricter than the one set by the hushkit Regulation,3 ° the EU is
willing to withdraw the Regulation only if the United States gives
a written commitment to support the adoption of the stricter
Chapter 4 noise standard. The United States, however, says that
it is not willing to negotiate under duress 31 and that writing the
criteria and definition of the Stage 4 standard would render the
current aircraft equipment prematurely obsolete. 2
Because the United States has not given any firm commitment
to develop the Chapter 4 standard, the EU intends to keep the
Regulation in place until the General Assembly of ICAO meets
in September 2001. 33 Loyola de Palacio, 34 the new vice-presi-
dent of the European Commission who is also in charge of en-
ergy and transport policy, points out that even if the EU would
be willing to delay the implementation of the Regulation, the
delay would be complicated by the new Treaty of Amsterdam,
under which many regulations not only require approval from
the 15 EU Member States but also from the European Parlia-
ment. Because the European Parliament has the reputation of
being much "greener" than the EU governments, a Commission
decision delaying the application of the Regulation for at least
another year could be seriously jeopardized. 5
In order to get out of the current deadlock situation, the State
Department is expected to effectively lodge a complaint with the
ICAO in mid-March. 6 Once the ICAO receives the complaint it
will review the legal arguments, translate the complaint into six
United Nations languages and distribute it to the 33 members of
the ICAO Council. The EU will have 90 days for a rebuttal and
- See Paul Mann, Diplomacy Takes Hold In Hushkit Squabble-Washington and
Brussels Jockey for Advantage in Their Dispute Over Aircraft Noise Reduction, AVIATION
WY. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 20, 1999, at 45.
31 Geoff Winestock, et al., A Special Background Report on European Union Business
and Polities, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 18, 1999, at 1.
32 See Mann, supra note 24, at 30.
33 See European Commission Welcomes New Prospects for Progress on Stricter Aircraft
Noise Abatement, PR NEWSWiRE, Oct. 7, 1999; see also Mann, supra note 24, at 30.
34 As of September 17, 1999, a new European Commission was confirmed in
office. The function of Commissioner for Transport, previously held by Neil Kin-
nock, was taken over by Loyola de Palacio. Ms. Loyola de Palacio serves as vice-
president of the European Commission as well as Commissioner for Transport
and Energy.
35 See Geoff Winestock & Brandon Mitchener, U.S., EU Face Deadline on Ameri-
can Planes - Noise-Pollution Regulation Could Bar Many Aircraft From European Skies,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 11, 1999, at Al8.
36 The author completed this Article during February 2000 and accordingly
does not yet know the outcome of the above-mentioned complaint.
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then ICAO will decide how to proceed, with mediation or a full
trial being two of the range of options available. 7 A decision for
the United States could force the EU to drop the hushkit Regu-
lation or effectively give up its voting rights within ICAO .3 In
retaliation for the United States filing the Article 84 complaint,
the EU has threatened to enact the ban immediately reducing
the likelihood of a settlement even more.3 9
The goal of this paper is to assess the compatibility of the Reg-
ulation with the international obligations of the EU and/or its
Member States under existing multilateral and bilateral
agreements. 40
Part I provides background information on the dispute, be-
ginning with a brief explanation of how aircraft noise is gener-
ated and ending with a discussion on how international treaties,
such as the Chicago Convention, or international organizations,
such as the EU, have tried to solve this problem.
Part II summarizes the positions of the United\States govern-
ment and the European Union with regard to the legality and
defensibility of the Regulation and provides two aircraft noise
studies.
Part III gives an overview of problems faced by airports in the
EU and the U.S.
Part TV looks at the compatibility of the Regulation with the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agree-
ment")41 and with the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS") .42
Part V examines whether the EU and its Member States are
complying with their Chicago Convention obligations and their
s7 Kristin S. Krause, Line in the Sand, TRAImc WORLD, Feb. 7, 2000.
38 James Cox, Hush Kit Ban Raises Ante in U.S.-EU Trade War, USA TODAY, Dec.
23, 1999, at 3B.
- See Krause, supra note 37.
4 The author does not examine in detail the technical side of this problem,
except where technical reports and findings are inextricably linked to the discus-
sion of legal issues.
41 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-6
(Dec. 15, 1993), in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
42 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Doc. MTN/FA 1I-AIB (Dec. 15,
1993), in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993) reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 44
(1994).
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bilateral obligations with the United States by enacting the
Regulation.
Part VI proposes several alternatives and/or modifications to
the Regulation in order to make it (more) compatible with the
international obligations of the EU under the Chicago Conven-




Aircraft noise heard on the ground comes from three differ-
ent sources. First, the noise is a mixture of sources originating
within the aircraft engines and those produced by the jet ex-
hausts, where high-velocity gases are propelled into the atmos-
pheric air ('Jet noise")." An additional source of noise occurs
on final approach to land, with the engines at low power and
creating minimum noise. At that moment, aerodynamic distur-
bances caused by the deployment of the flaps and undercarriage
produce a significant source of "airframe" noise.44
The noise generated within the engine is mainly high-fre-
quency whereas the jet noise and the airframe noise are low-
frequency.45 Low-frequency noise sources travel large distances
from the aircraft and are noticed most by people living in air-
port surroundings.46
The intensity of the noise from a jet is a function of jet veloc-
ity to a high power, which is typically around eight. A halving or
doubling of jet velocity, therefore, can be responsible for a
change of some twenty decibels ("dB") in source noise output,
equivalent to a fourfold change in loudness or annoyance. En-
gine bypass ratio ("BPR") 47 dictates the velocity of the jet ex-
haust flow and is fundamental to the production of noise in the
mixing process with the atmosphere. Efficiency increases and
jet exhaust noise decreases for normal subsonic flight opera-
43 See Planes Getting Quieter; Noise Standard in Effect Jan. 1, CINCINNATI POST,
Dec. 21, 1999, at 7A; see also M.J.T. Smith, Final Report, Study on the Assessment
of the Environmental Performance of Recertificated Chapter 3 Aircraft Com-
pared to Aircraft Initially Manufactured to Chapter 3 Standards: Recertificated
Aircraft and the Environment: An Opinion 10 (April 1999) (unpublished study,
on file with the European Commission).
44 See Smith, supra note 43, at 10.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 For a definition, see supra note 10.
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tions as bypass ratio increases, and less fuel is used by unit of
overall thrust.4"
B. THE EFFECTS OF AIRCRAFT NOISE ON HUMAN HEALTH
There is ample medical evidence that excessive noise in gen-
eral, and aerial noise in particular, cause mental disorders and
other detrimental psychological effects on human beings.49
Specifically, aircraft noise leads to an increase in chronic fatigue
and neurotic complaints.5" Indeed, some studies have found
that the blood pressure and stress-related cholesterol levels rise
and irritability and fatigue increase when someone is exposed to
excessive noise levels for several hours. 1 In addition, according
to one study, children exposed to frequent aircraft noise at
school did not learn as well as other children who go to school
in a quieter environment.5 2
C. THE REGULATION OF AIRCRAFT NOISE
The regulation of aircraft noise can take place at various
'political' levels (internationally, nationally, or at a local level by
airport communities) and at three different stages:
(a) limitations on the certification of new designs and en-
gines are used to control and restrain the manufacturers (non-
production rule);
(b) national legislation may introduce restrictions on the ac-
quisition and/or on the registration of noisy aircraft by their air-
lines (non-addition rule);
(c) airlines may be prevented from operating noisy aircraft or
be subject to some form of noise restriction (daily time curfews,
for example) by local airport regulations (non-operation
rule) .'
48 See Smith, supra note 43, at 11.
49 See R.I.R. Abeyratne, Aircraft Engine Emissions and Noise, 24 ENVTL. POL'Y & L.
238, 241 (1994).
50 See ALEXANDER COHEN, NOISE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE 25 (1968); see also
Donald V. Harper, Regulation of Aircraft Noise at Major Airports: Past, Present, and
Future, 17 TRANsp. L.J. 117, 121 (1988).
51 See Peter Gruner, Now Hear This: Noises of the City Can Cause Heart Failure,
EVENING STANDARD-LONDON, Oct. 9, 1998, at 18.
52 See id.
53 CAROLE BLAc sHAw, AVIATION LAW & REGULATION 229-41 (1992).
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1. The International Regulation of Aircraft Noise: The Chicago
Convention
Given the enormous importance of air transport during the
Second World War, nations realized that the development of
uniform rules in international civil aviation was necessary to se-
cure international peace. At the initiative of the United States
Government, an International Civil Aviation Conference was
held in Chicago in November 1944. The Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation ("Chicago Convention")5 4 was adopted at
this meeting. National security reasons and economic protec-
tionism made absolute state sovereignty,5 5 as well as the equal
right of all signatories to participate in international air trans-
portation, 6 the core principles of the Chicago Convention.57
The Chicago Convention introduced guidelines for flight
over the territory of signatory States, aircraft nationality and
ownership as well as air navigation rules. 58 The Chicago Con-
vention also created the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion ("ICAO") to foster the planning and development of
international air transport.
ICAO created the Committee on Aviation Environmental Pro-
tection ("CAEP") 51 in 1983 primarily to address environmental
problems connected with the increasing significance of air
transport. CAEP is also charged with making recommendations
regarding noise and emissions to the Council of ICAO.60
54 See Chicago Convention, supra note 5.
55 See Chicago Convention, Art. 1, supra note 5.
56 See Chicago Convention, Art. 44 (f), supra note 5.
57 See Andras Vamos-Goldman, The Stagnation of Economic Regulation Under Pub-
lic International Air Law: Examining Its Contribution to the Woeful State of the Airline
Industry, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 425, 430-434 (1996); see also Benoit M.J. Swinnen, An
Opportunity for Trans Atlantic Civil Aviation: From Open Skies to Open Markets?, 63 J.
AIR L. & COM. 249, 254 (1997).
-s See Heather L. Miller, Civil Aircraft Emissions and International Treaty Law, 63
J. AIR L. & COM. 697, 706 (1998).
59 The Member States participating in the Committee on Aviation Environ-
mental Protection (CAEP) are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
Observers in CAEP are: Greece; Airports Council International-ACI; Arab Civil
Aviation Commission-ACAC; Commission of the European Communities-EC; In-
ternational Air Transport Association-IATA; International Coordinating Council
of Aerospace Industries Associations-ICCAIA; International Federation of Air
Line Pilots' Associations-IFALPA; World Meteorological Organization-WMO. See
Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://
www.icao.org/icao/en/env/CAEPMEM.HTM>.
- See Miller, supra note 58, at 714.
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The Council, which is the governing body of ICAO, adopts
International Standards and Recommended Practices
("SARPs"). SARPs are subsequently incorporated into Annexes
to the Chicago Convention.61 SARPS relating to environmental
aspects of aviation were first adopted on April 2, 1971, and des-
ignated as Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention, entitled "Envi-
ronmental Protection."62 Annex 16 was adopted following the
recommendations of the "Special Meeting on Aircraft Noise in
the Vicinity of Aerodromes," held in 1969.63 Volume I of Annex
16 includes provisions for the uniform measurement of aircraft
noise levels and noise certification standards that govern any air-
craft currently built. Volume II sets forth aircraft engine emis-
sions standards.
Volume I of Annex 16 distinguishes jet-powered aircraft along
three levels of stringency. Chapter 1 refers to non-noise certifi-
cated ("NNC") airplanes and includes all aircraft that cannot
comply with Chapter 2 standards, including most types of Boe-
ing-707, McDonnell Douglas DC-8, Convairs, Caravelles, and Tri-
dents. Most of these airplanes are obsolete in many parts of the
world because of age and because they do not comply with cur-
rent noise regulations.64
Chapter 2 of Volume I of Annex 16 introduces the first noise
stringency standards. It applies to brand-new first-time certifi-
cated jet aircraft, i.e., aircraft for which the application for a cer-
tificate of airworthiness for the prototype was accepted (the so-
called prototype certification) or another equivalent procedure
had been carried out before October 6, 1977. Several aircraft
types receive exceptional treatment under Chapter 2. The "ef-
fective perceived noise level" (EPNdB) measures the noise level,
and Chapter 2 precludes aircraft from exceeding a certain maxi-
61 See Chicago Convention, Art. 34, 54(1), supra note 5, at 1189, 1197.
62 See Abeyratne, supra note 49, at 242.
63 See Jeffrey Goh, Problems of Transnational Regulation: A Case Study of Aircraft
Noise Regulation in the European Community, 23 TRANSp. L. J. 277, 284 (1995).
64 The U.S. introduced an operational ban on Stage 1 aircraft effective January
1, 1985, while most European countries banned Chapter 1 aircraft effective Janu-
ary 1, 1988. Unlike the US., many European countries granted exemptions to
developing countries until December 31, 1989. See Council Directive 83/206/
EEC of 21 April 1983 amending Directive 80/51/EEC on the Limitation of Noise
Emissions from Subsonic Aircraft, 1983 O.J. (L 117) 15; see also, 14 C.F.R. part
91, Subpart I, Operating Noise Limits, Sec. 91-805.
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mum EPNdB at specific moments. Chapter 2 also contains de-
tailed technical procedures to calculate these noise standards.65
Chapter 3 applies more stringent standards to aircraft
designed after October 6, 1977. Accordingly, many aircraft do
not meet these standards. For example, Chapter 3 excludes
Boeing-727s, Boeing-737-200s, McDonell Douglas DC-9s and
Boeing-737-1 OOs. 66
The EU is of the opinion that the Chapter 3 standard, which
was adopted more than twenty years ago (1977), no longer re-
flects the latest engine technology. Indeed, according to ICAO
CAEP/3, the purpose of noise certification is "to ensure that the
latest available noise reduction technology is incorporated into
the aircraft design. '6 7 The noise limits contained in the Chapter
3 standard have not been adapted during the past twenty years
despite the spectacular improvements in engine noise control
that now provide substantially lower noise levels.68 Apparently,
aircraft are manufactured today that are twenty three dB quieter
than the baseline Chapter 3 standard.69
In 1990, the ICAO General Assembly adopted a resolution al-
lowing states that have noise problems to start phasing out oper-
ations by Chapter 2 aircraft between 1995 and 2002.70 In
addition, at the request of several environmental groups and lo-
cal airport communities, the EU significantly pressured the
other parties of ICAO to make the current Chapter 3 standard
more stringent. Between 1992 and 1998, all progress on this
issue had been halted primarily by the United States and the
African States.71 Contrary to the EU's expectations and despite
three years of preparatory technical work, the members of
CAEP/3 were unable to reach a consensus on a new noise stan-
65 For a detailed discussion on the noise certification process, see Troy A. Rolf,
International Aircraft Noise Certification, 165J. AIR L. & CoM. 383 (2000).
- See BtcKsHrAw, supra note 53, 238-39.
67 ICAO COMMITTEE ON AVIATION ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, THIRD MEET-
ING, 1.5.6 (1995) [hereinafter CAEP/3].
68 See Smith, supra note 43, at 5-6.
69 See Philippe Harmon, Letters to the Editor, Put a Muffler on That Plane, WALL
ST.J. EUR., Oct. 12, 1999, at 11.
70 See ICAO, Aircraft Noise, (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://www.icao.int/icao/
en/env/noise.htm>.
71 See European Commission, Transport Directorate-general, Information Pack -
Aircraft Noise: The Recertificated Aircraft Regulation, 1-16, Aug. 26, 1999, at 1-16
[hereinafter Information Pack].
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dard.72 The EU claims that the United States requested that this
issue not be given priority on CAEP's work agenda.v3
In conclusion, the international aviation community has
merely reached a consensus allowing member states to restrict
the operation of all aircraft that do not meet the Chapter 3 stan-
dard, as of April 1, 2002. TM Due to the lack of progress within
CAEP, however, the international aviation community has yet to
agree on a policy to reduce noise after the 2002 deadline. In-
deed, at the last CAEP/4 meeting in 1998, no agreement was
reached on the future Chapter 4 noise standards. 75 Taking into
account the current heightened tensions between the United
States and the EU, it remains to be seen whether the CAEP
member states will be able to agree on the stricter Chapter 4
noise standard at the next ICAO General Assembly in Septem-
ber 2001.
2. The Problem and the Regulation of Aircraft Noise within the
European Union
a. The Aircraft Noise Problem in the European Union
European citizens are increasingly protesting against the ris-
ing noise pollution around Community airports, which are often
located close to densely populated urban communities.7 6 In-
deed, Europe has far worse noise problems than the United
States so the issue of stricter noise standards is more poignant. 77
Even Congressman James Oberstar (D-Minn.), one of the ac-
knowledged aviation specialists on Capitol Hill, recognized that
Europe's comparative shortage of geographic space compels Eu-
rope's urban population to live closer to airports than do U.S.
citizens.78
According to Dave Tompkins, head of operations for the
United Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority, governments ur-
72 See ICAO, ICAO 32nd Assembly - Report of the Executive Committee, (visited Jan.
16, 2000) <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/a32report.htm> [hereinafter
ICAO Executive Committee].
73 See Information Pack, supra note 71.
74 See ICAO, Resolutions Adopted at the 32nd Session of the Assembly, Resolution
A32-8-App. D (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/a32/
resolutions.pdf>.
75 See ICAO Executive Committee, supra note 72.
76 For example, the French National Association Against Aircraft Noise and
Pollution.
77 See Lori Lessner, European Efforts to Regulate Airplane Noise Spark U.S. Outcry,
WICHITA EAGLE, Sept. 18, 1999.
78 See Mann, supra note 30, at 45-46.
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gently need to take steps to quiet aircraft since almost every Eu-
ropean airport is at capacity. If the noise is not dealt with
adequately, Tompkins fears that individual airports will take ac-
tion since noise abatement measures are urgently necessary to
allow airports to implement their expansion plans.79
In addition, Airports Council International Europe ("ACI-Eu-
rope"), which represents 450 commercial airports in Europe,
fully supports the enforcement of the EU's Regulation 0 and
also considers the Regulation to be necessary for the growth of
the aviation sector.8 1
Accordingly, the threat is that if the EU did not enact the cur-
rent measure, individual Member States, at the request of local
airport communities, might unilaterally impose noise restric-
tions that threaten the European market as a single economic
entity in the field of civil aviation. 2 Several countries have al-
ready taken such unilateral measures. For example, in August
1996, the UK Government decided unilaterally to impose noise
limits at three London airports: Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stan-
sted. 3 Similarly, on October 21, 1996, the Italian Environment
Ministry introduced a series of similar measures aimed at quel-
ling noise around the airports of Fiumicino in Rome and
Malpensa in Milan. Another more recent example of such uni-
lateral action is the Belgian Government's decision of early Feb-
ruary to reduce aircraft noise for takeoffs between 11 p.m. and 6
a.m. by thirty percent by July 2003.84 Other countries in Eu-
79 Stage 4 Noise Restriction Will Be Law Sooner Than Later: FAA, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS,
Sept. 20, 1999.
8o See Statement Approved by the Board of ACI Europe at Their Meeting in
Vienna on 20 January 1999, European Airports support Community initiative to
restrict the use of hushkitted aircraft, Feb. 4, 1999; see also Harmon, supra note 69.
8] See Pollution Online, European Airports Agree With EU on Hush Kit Ban (visited
Jan. 31, 2000) <http://news.pollutiononline.com/wires/article.asp?DocID={
BC2AB848-F5 1B-1 1D2-A405-00C04F4F7C39}>.
82 See European Union, EU Transport Ministers Postpone Hushkit Issue (visited Jan.
31, 2000) <http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1999/1999014.htm>.
83 See Dr. Pablo Mendes de Leon, Aviation and the Environment: Changing Percep-
tions, 22 AiR & SPACE L. 131, 131 (1997).
84 Nancy Nackaerts, Belgian Govt To Reduce Aircraft Noise By 30% By July
2003, Dow JONES NEWS SERV. Feb. 11, 2000. Early January 2000, Belgian's trans-
port minister, Isabelle Durant, had published a draft law banning all flights to
and from Brussels airport between 1 am and 5 am as of 2003. Due to fierce
protest from DHL, which has its world-wide headquarters and European air-
freight hub in Brussels, and other cabinet members, Ms. Durant had to withdraw
the draft bill. The government nevertheless decided to introduce measures to
curb aircraft noise at Brussels National Airport. The Government plans to phase
in noise quotas on nighttime flights that will become gradually stricter. SeeJohn
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rope, such as Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark
took, or are intending to take, similar unilateral actions.
As mentioned above, the EU has been advocating the adop-
tion of stricter noise standards within ICAO since 1992. Because
no progress has been made so far, and in response to strong
environmental pressures within the fifteen Member States, espe-
cially in Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Spain,86
the EU decided to at least restrain hushkitted aircraft from dis-
proportionately taking up noise capacity at Europe's airports.
b. The Regulation of Aircraft Noise within the European
Union
The Regulation represents another step in the EU's continu-
ous effort to combat the detrimental effect of noise on the envi-
ronment. As early as 1973, the EU adopted its first
environmental action program. The program officially recog-
nized noise as a severe environmental problem.87 The fifth ac-
tion program of 1992 on the environment supports the
adoption of further measures aimed at reducing noise emissions
from aircraft.
The acknowledgment of aircraft noise as a serious source of
noise pollution led to the adoption of four European direc-
tives.88 These Directives were all enacted with a view to imple-
menting the ICAO standards, contained in Volume I of Annex
16.89
Concerned that the air transport industry is growing faster
than the technological and operational devices designed to re-
duce its harmful environmental effects, Loyola de Palacio and
Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstrom announced in
December 1999 a framework for a new environmental policy to
improve environmental standards, in particular noise and emis-
sion pollution.90
Carreyrou, Brussels Tempers light Ban-DHL Welcomes New Government Measures To
Curb Aircraft Noise at Night, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2000.
85 See Mendes de Leon, supra note 83 at 131.
86 See Europe Considers Delaying Hushkit Ban, AVIATION DAiLY, Oct. 7, 1999, at 1.
87 See Goh, supra note 63, at 286.
88 See Council Directive 80/51/EEC, 1979 Oj. (L 18) 26; Council Directive
83/206/EEC, 1983 O.J. (L 117) 15; Council Directive 89/629/EEC 1989 O.J. (L
363) 27; Council Directive 92/14/EEC, 1992 Oj. (L 76) 21, as amended by
Council Directive 98/20/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 107) 4.
89 See Goh, supra note 63, at 287.
90 See EU Commission Pushes Own Agenda, WORLD AiRUNE NEWS, Dec. 3, 1999.
20001 343
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
At airport level, aircraft noise will be addressed through the
creation of a Community framework on the noise classification
of aircraft. This system tries to unify the levels of charges, cur-
rently being levied at some European airports to deter the use of
noisy aircraft, by creating a common noise classification scheme.
In addition, the Commission proposes a noise measurement in-
dex, a methodology for noise calculation and a minimum re-
quirement for noise monitoring. The idea behind all this it to
give preference to operations with quieter aircraft when defin-
ing priority criteria for re-allocation from the pool of slots.91
The Commission hopes that a system of overall noise quotas at
individual airports will push airlines to use quieter aircraft in
order to obtain slots.92
c. The Disputed EU Hushkit Regulation
The Regulation establishes conditions for registration and op-
eration of recertificated aircraft in the European Community.
According to Article 2 of the Regulation, recertificated aircraft
includes aircraft initially certificated to Chapter 2 or equivalent
standards, or initially not noise-certificated but modified
through technical measures, including hushkits, engine modifi-
cations or other technical measures, or through operational re-
strictions, such as weight restrictions and reduced flap settings.9"
However, aircraft that have been modified to meet the Chapter
3 standard by being completely reengined with engines having a
bypass ratio 94 of three or more are not to be considered as recer-
tificated aircraft. A contrario, this means that aircraft reengined
with engines having a bypass ratio of less than three are to be
treated as recertificated aircraft.
The Regulation introduces a "non-addition" and a "non-oper-
ation" rule. The non-addition rule prohibits EU Member States
from adding recertificated aircraft to their registers after May 4,
2000."5 A recertificated aircraft, however, that was on the regis-
ter of an EU Member State before May 4, 2000 can be trans-
ferred to the national register of another EU Member State
91 See Graham Dunn, EC Details Plans for Tough Environmental Rules, AIR TRANS-
PORT INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 3, 1999.
92 See id.
93 See Regulation, Art. 2.2, supra note 11, at 48.
94 For a definition of bypass ratio, see supra note 10.
95 See Regulation, Art. 3.1, supra note 11, at 49.
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without losing its right to operate into the Community after
April 1, 2002.96
The Regulation also introduces a non-operation rule. Under
this rule, non-complying third country aircraft are prohibited
from operating in the territory of the Community after April 1,
2002, unless the airline can prove that the aircraft was on the
register of that third country on May 4, 2000, and had a history
of Community operations between April 1, 1995, and May 4,
2000." 7 To ensure non-discriminatory treatment of all aircraft,
the Regulation applies the same non-operation rule after April
1, 2002, to aircraft registered in an EC Member State,98 except
that transferred aircraft from the register of one Member State
to another Member State is still allowed to operate. 99
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION VERSUS THE
UNITED STATES
A. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
1. The United States's Position
The United States Government, acting on behalf of its carri-
ers, and hushkit and engine manufacturers, opposes the EU
Regulation on several grounds:
a. Compatibility with the Chicago Convention
By unilaterally imposing a stricter noise standard than the
standard specified in Chapter 3 of Volume I of Annex 16 to the
Chicago Convention, the United States claims that the EU and
its Member States are violating their obligations under the Chi-
cago Convention and under the bilateral air services agreements
concluded with the U.S.
In particular, the Regulation allegedly violates Article 33 of
the Chicago Convention and similar articles of the bilateral air
service agreements because it refuses to give universal recogni-
tion to U.S. certificates of airworthiness despite U.S. carriers'
compliance with all current ICAO standards.
In addition, the United States claims that the measure gives
Airbus, the European manufacturing consortium, a boost over
96 See Regulation, Art. 3.2, supra note 11, at 49.
97 See Regulation, Art. 3.3, supra note 11, at 49.
98 See Regulation, Art. 3.4, supra note 11, at 49.
9 See Statement of the Council's Reasons, 1998 O.J. (c 404) 5, 5.
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Boeing in aircraft sales100 and favors EU carriers over U.S. carri-
ers contrary to the non-discrimination obligation of Article 15 of
the Chicago Convention and similar articles of the bilateral air
services agreements, which oblige both parties to give each
other's carriers a fair and equal opportunity to compete.
In particular, the transfer rule (as described above) would re-
quire EU carriers to buy second-hand aircraft from other Mem-
ber States instead of from non-European carriers. Non-
European carriers will refrain from buying older aircraft from
U.S. carriers if such aircraft can no longer be operated in the
territory of the EU. This diminishes the value of the commer-
cial U.S. fleet and allegedly is contrary to the rationale of the
standardization process carried out within the framework of
ICAO (allowing a certain degree of comparability and inter-
changeability of air transport related products).1°1
b. The Shortened Phase-out of Chapter 2 Aircraft
The United States claims that the decision to phase out Chap-
ter 2 aircraft by 2000 (15 months ahead of the April 2002 ICAO
deadline) 102 had only a negligible effect on business decisions of
U.S. air carriers whether or not to invest in hushkits or in more
expensive, new technology engines. Contrary to the EU allega-
tions, the United States asserts that the extra 15 months allowed
by ICAO would not have induced U.S. carriers to invest in new
aircraft rather than in lower cost hushkitted technology.
c. The Alleged Losses
The United States alleges that the Regulation has already cost
American businesses $2.1 billion (1.97 billion euros)I 3 in spare
parts and engine sales, reduced the commercial resale value of
100 SeeJames Cox, Hush Kit Ban Raises Ante in U.S.-EU Trade War, USA TODAY,
Dec. 23, 1999, at 3B.
101 SeeJacques Nusbaumer, The GATT Standards Code in Operation, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 542, 549 (1984).
102 To combat aviation noise, the U.S. Congress passed Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388-378 (codified as 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521-33 (1994)). This law requires
certain categories of aircraft to be fully Stage 3 compliant by December 31, 1999,
15 months ahead of the ICAO deadline.
103 Aerospace Industries Association alleges that U.S. companies, including the
Pratt & Whitney unit of United Technologies Corp., the Nordam Group, and B.
F. Goodrich Co., have already suffered $2.1 billion (1.97 billion euros) in airline
fleet depreciation and lost sales as a result of the mere threat of the rule. In
particular, Pratt & Whitney, the principal manufacturer of American-made
hushkits, estimates that it will lose $515 million in orders as a result of the EU
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over 1,600 U.S. aircraft, and caused financial losses for U.S.
hushkit manufacturers.1 4 The internationally agreed aircraft
certification scheme of ICAO assures investors of the worldwide
marketability for the life of an aircraft. Despite the one year
delay, the intended unilateral deviation by the EU from the
ICAO certification scheme allegedly has already delayed sub-
stantial investments.
d. The Noise Issue
According to U.S. technical experts, aircraft equipped with
hushkits would make far less noise than some originally certifi-
cated aircraft. In addition, the United States questions the valid-
ity of the criteria of a bypass ratio of 3 in order to distinguish
between permitted and prohibited reengined aircraft.
e. Performance Standard Versus Design Standard
If the European Union is really concerned about the environ-
mental pollution produced by aircraft, the United States argues
that it should introduce a performance standard rather than a
design standard, in compliance with the Agreement on Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade.
2. The Position of the European Union
The European Union presents several arguments to defend
the validity of its Regulation.
a. Compatibility with the Chicago Convention
The EU claims that it did not violate the Chicago Convention
or its bilateral air service agreements because it merely freezes
existing noise levels around Community airports. Indeed, the
measure only prevents countries from continuing to add aircraft
to their registers that only marginally comply with the Chapter 3
standard. The Regulation, however, still allows such "noisy" air-
ban. See Congress Threatens No Stage 4 Agreement Unless EU Drops Hushkit Ban, AIR-
LINE FIN. NEWS, Sept. 27, 1999.
104 See Complaint of Northwest Airlines, Inc. against The Council of the Euro-
pean Union and the Governments of the 15 EU Member States before the De-
partment of Transportation, Docket OST-99-; see also U.S. House Transp. &
Infrastructure Comm., Hollings, Oberstar Bills Would Halt Concorde Flights in U.S.
Airspace-Action in Response to E.U. noise policy-House T&I Committee will mark-up
Thursday, (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http://www.house.gov/transporta-
tiondemocrats/press/990210_concorde.htm>.
20001 347
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
craft currently serving Community airports to further operate
into the Community after April 1, 2002.
In addition, the recertification process of hushkitted aircraft
is contrary to the purpose of the ICAO noise certification rules,
i.e., to ensure that the latest available noise reduction technol-
ogy is incorporated in the aircraft design. 10 5
And last, because the non-operation rule applies both to EU
and U.S. carriers, the EU claims that the Regulation does not
violate Article 15 of the Chicago Convention or the "fair and
equal opportunity to compete" obligation of the bilateral air
services agreements. 10 6
b. The Shortened Phase-out of Chapter 2 Aircraft
The EU argues that the U.S. administration has caused the
difficulties that U.S. carriers are currently encountering by uni-
laterally anticipating the deadline to phase out Chapter 2 stan-
dard aircraft by 2000.107 These stricter time limits pushed U.S.
carriers to opt for the cheap hushkit solution rather than to in-
vest in new, less noisy, more environmentally friendly aircraft.
In addition, the use of hushkits is not consistent with the pur-
pose of the ICAO standard in terms of overall noise reduction
through the best available technology. 08 If the EU would with-
draw the measure, the condition would be an expeditious devel-
opment and implementation of the Chapter 4 standard. The
problems currently faced by U.S. carriers and manufacturers
would simply be delayed since these aircraft will be obsolete
within two or three years. James Erickson, director of the Office
of Environment and Energy of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, pointed out that the Stage 4 noise standard will need to be
implemented much quicker than the Stage 3, for which airlines
were granted almost 10 years. The deadline could even be
105 See CAEP/3, supra note 67, at 1.5.6.
106 For example, Article 11 of the Air Transport Agreement between the
United States and Luxembourg, signed at Luxembourg Aug. 19, 1986, and en-
tered into force Aug. 3, 1988. DOS: 88-252; TIAS: TIAS 11249.
107 In particular, the U.S. set forth three progressive compliance levels for air-
craft to meet by the end of 1994, 1996, and 1998 during the interim period. See
49 U.S.C. §47528 (1999), Prohibition on Operating Certain Aircraft not Comply-
ing with Stage 3 noise levels; 14 C.F.R. part 91, Subpart I, Operating Noise Limits,
Sec. 91-865.
108 See CAEP/3, supra note 67, at 1.5.6.
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within five years, according to Erickson, which would force air-
lines to spend billions of dollars to upgrade their fleets.' 0 9
c. The Alleged Losses
The EU alleges that the United States is unable to provide
sufficient evidence that the Regulation would cost two billion
dollars to the U.S. aviation industry. First, U.S. carriers allegedly
only operate a limited number of hushkitted aircraft between
the United States and the EU.
Second, the Regulation has only a limited impact on the re-
sale market of older aircraft because such aircraft are in any
event at or close to the end of their economic life.
Third, the EU hushkit Regulation is only one of the reasons
why airlines start to update their fleets. The replacement of
older Chapter 2 aircraft by Chapter 3 aircraft is also economi-
cally advantageous to airlines. Many airlines start replacing
Chapter 2 aircraft because of the benefits gained from higher
daily utilization rates and lower maintenance and direct operat-
ing costs of first-time certificated Chapter 3 aircraft.110 Another
factor pushing airlines to replace older aircraft are stringent and
costly regulations. Many airlines seem concerned with recent
and pending Federal Aviation Administration regulations man-
dating more careful inspections of components, wiring, and fuel
systems of older aircraft that would further increase mainte-
nance costs."'
d. The Noise Issue
The EU adduces significant evidence"12 to prove that the
noise emission levels as well as the gaseous emissions perform-
ances and fuel consumption of recertificated aircraft are signifi-
cantly worse than that of current technology aircraft originally
109 Indeed, the proposals being discussed by the ICAO working parties range
from no action at all to a ban on Chapter 3 compliant aircraft as early as 2011.
See Chapter 4 Noise Proposals Start to Enter Residual Value Calculations, AIRCRAFr
VALuE NEWS, Dec. 6, 1999.
110 Hawaiian Airlines management decided to replace its existing DC-9 fleet
with 13 Boeing 717s because the higher daily utilization, lower maintenance, and
direct operating costs are expected to save it $200 million over 10 years. These
prospects of lower maintenance and direct operating costs encouraged TWA,
Delta Air Lines, Air Tran, and American Airlines to make similar fleet replace-
ment decisions. See Edward Tripp, Capacity, Cost, Noise Issues Accelerate Fleet Replace-
ments, AERO SAFETY & MAINTENANCE, Oct. 29, 1999, at 4.
-1 See id. at 4.
112 See infra Part III.A.
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certificated to meet the Chapter 3 standard. Accordingly, in or-
der to prevent a further deterioration of the noise situation, en-
vironmental groups have lobbied hard for the adoption of this
Regulation.
In addition, the EU maintains that the goal of this Regulation
is to preserve the opportunities for further growth in air traffic
in Europe to the benefit of all carriers, including U.S.
carriers.113
e. Performance Versus Design Standard
The EU asserts that the use of a design standard is not explic-
itly prohibited by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(see below).
B. THE PARTIES' POSITIONS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Recertificated ex-Chapter 2 aircraft undeniably incorporate
older and often outdated technology. Some of the designs date
back to the 1960s. In order to meet the Chapter 3 standard,
these aircraft are modified through technical measures, such as
hushkits, engine modifications or replacements, or through op-
erational restrictions such as weight restrictions and reduced
flap settings. Even if these measures reduce the noise pollution
to some extent, recertificated aircraft still have a worse noise
performance, weight for weight, than first-time certificated
Chapter 3 aircraft. Studies carried out on both sides of the At-
lantic as well as local measures taken by airports in the EU and
in the United States clearly support this.
1. Study on the Assessment of the Environmental Impact of
Recertificated Chapter 3 Aircraft Versus "First-time"
Certificated Chapter 3 Aircraft1 4
An independent study carried out at the request of the Euro-
pean Commission concludes that aircraft designed from the out-
set to satisfy Chapter 3 are superior in all environmental
respects to recertificated aircraft, except where an aircraft is to-
tally reengined with a modern high bypass ratio turbofan. In
addition, noise certification results suggest that the dividing line
113 See Information Pack, supra note 71.
114 This chapter is entirely based on a study, carried out by M.J.T. Smith for the
European Commission. See Smith, supra note 43.
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between "noisy" low bypass and "quiet" high bypass engines is
situated close to a bypass ratio of 3.
This study asserts that the recertification process of original
Chapter 2 aircraft necessitates limits on the maximum takeoff
weight and/or changes to operational procedures as well as en-
gineering modifications in order to satisfy the Chapter 3 stan-
dard. These changes made to recertificated or hushkitted
aircraft, including partial or complete engine replacement with
low bypass ratio jet engines, do not reduce noise sufficiently to
produce aircraft that complies with the certification standards
with the same margins as aircraft originally certificated to Chap-
ter 3. Accordingly, these ex-Chapter 2 aircraft are not nearly as
quiet as the more modern aircraft in everyday operation.
While the claims of proponents of recertification through
hushkitting or reengining may well be valid, they ignore the vital
underlying issue that if the older aircraft were retired early in
2002, as intended, they would be replaced by modern counter-
parts that are better with respect to noise, fuel efficiency, and
exhaust emissions than the designs that date back to the 1960s.
Modern turbofan-powered aircraft of equivalent size as the
older low bypass aircraft they replace generate a minimum of 5
EPNdB average improvement over hushkitted types. A 5dB re-
duction in noise reduces the takeoff noise footprint area by
more than 50%. Modern counterparts often achieve a further
5dB noise reduction, which would equate to a reduction in the
basic noise contour area (zone around airport affected by air-
craft noise) by around 80%. These modern aircraft also have a
much better fuel efficiency rate and produce less exhaust gas
emissions than the older aircraft.
a. Noise Certification
Although the purpose of noise certification is to ensure that
the latest available noise reduction technology is incorporated
into the aircraft design, the Chapter 3 noise standard was intro-
duced 20 years ago, before the main benefits of such technology
had been incorporated into the aircraft product. In addition,
during these past 20 years, the Chapter 3 standard has not been
adapted to reflect the new improvements in engine noise con-
trol and in other general engine and airframe technologies.
The current "state of the art" aircraft, in which the latest tech-
nology has been built-in, often have substantial margins with re-
spect to the Chapter 3 standard while hushkitted aircraft have
not. The increase in the stringency of the noise standard is
2000]
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therefore a high priority on the agenda of CAEP/5 in 2001.
The CAEP will have to address the issue of how the Chapter 3
framework can be made more representative of modern operat-
ing conditions and present-day noise disturbance around air-
ports. The distances of the basic three reference points
(Lateral, Flyover, and Approach) 115 were adjusted in the 1960s
to permit aircraft to reach the same maximum 108EPNdB at
each point. Therefore, compliance with Chapter 3 is not neces-
sarily a true indication of how quiet an aircraft appears to resi-
dents living around airports.
Many hushkitted aircraft are "shoehorned" into compliance
with Chapter 3 by taking advantage of the "trade-off' allowance
between the three reference points of the noise certification
process. Within the individual limit of 2 EPNdB, an excess at
one or two of the reference points can be compensated by a
compliance margin at the other reference point(s) but no more
than 3 EPNdB may be traded this way. Most high bypass (or
"turbofan") engined Chapter 3 aircraft do not have to use this
tradeoff because of their substantial compliance margins against
the standard.
Table 1 expresses the minimum and maximum margins of
compliance of hushkitted aircraft at each of the three reference
points individually, highlights any excesses, and provides the cu-
mulative values contained in the range of recertificated maxi-
mum takeoff weights. Table 2 summarizes the margins achieved
by Chapter 3 aircraft of similar weights as the hushkitted types.
It is clear from Table 1 that most hushkitted aircraft only
barely meet Chapter 3 and only if they rely on the "tradeoff'
allowance. Table 2, on the other hand, shows that aircraft
equipped with modern turbofan engines do not need to rely on
the tradeoff allowance to satisfy the standard, and even fre-
quently show large margins.
The 2000 product line, presented by manufacturers at the
ICAO CAEP/3 in December 1995, indicated average margins at
very high aircraft weights of some 5EPNdB at the three refer-
ence points. The margins for the lightest certificated weights
were almost 10EPNdB, which leads to a halving of noise per-
15 For a discussion of the three noise measurement points and the certifica-
tion process, see Rolf, supra note 65, at 393-99. Note that the Lateral Noise Mea-
surement Point is also known as the Sideline Noise Measurement Point and the
Flyover Noise Measurement Point as the Takeoff Noise Measurement Point.
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Table 1. Noise Margins (EPNdB) of Recertificated Aircraft
against Chapter 3
Aircraft and Takeoff
Engine Type Hushkit Weight Range Mi/Max Chapter 3 Compliance Margins
Tonnes Lateral Flyover Approach Cumulative*
B727-100 Fedex 72.5 - 76.8 -0.4 0.3 1.8 2.2
JT8D-15 0.4 1.9 2.7 4.6
B727-200 Fedex 76.8 - 80.5 -0.9 -1.9 0.4 0.1
JT8D-7/9 0.5 0.6 1.7 1.4
B727-200 Fedex 70.1 - 87.7 -2.0 -1.3 2.7 0.0
JT8D-15 -1.8 -0.4 3.3 1.0
B727-200RE Valsan 86.4 - 92.1 -2.0 1.2 2.0 1.9
JT8D-15/217C 0.0 3.9 2.4 4.2
B737-200/A AvAero 53.3 - 53.8 1.8 -2.0 3.1 0.2
JT8D-9/15 -0.1 -1.2 3.2 1.1
B-737-200 Nordam 47.0 - 54.2 -1.2 2.8 -0.1 0.0
JT8D-15/A -1.4 5.4 0.4 3.9
B737-200Adv Nordam 44.5 - 57.7 -1.8 -2.0 0.5 0.0
JT8D-15/A 1.3 4.4 3.1 3.9
DC9-10/30 ABS 41.1 - 46.7 -1.8 -1.4 2.9 0.0
JT8D-7/A/B/-9 1.6 0.9 3.5 2.7
DC8-62 BAC 152.0 - 160.1 -1.8 0.1 0.1 0.3
JT3D-3B/7 -1.6 2.0 2.9 1.7
* The cumulative values are the minimum and maximum margins of one of the recertificated
weights in the total range and do not necessarily correspond to the sum of individual minimum
and maximum values shown separately above for the three Reference conditions (Lateral,
Flyover and Approach).
Source: Smith, supra note 43, at 16-17.
ceived by the human being. Compared with the best margins
achieved by hushkitted aircraft, the differences are striking.
Despite the fact that the three reference points are based on
the main areas of noise impact around airports, it should be
remembered that Annex 16 is a basic standard, reflecting
neither the relative annoyance caused by different types of air-
craft nor the different operating procedures used by the
airlines.
One significant difference between the certification proce-
dure and the noise intrusion around airports is that Annex 16
allows the amount of noise from individual aircraft to increase
with higher weight whereas human annoyance increases with a
higher noise level, not aircraft size. For example, Chapter 3 al-
lows the noise on Flyover to increase by some 17EPNdB from
the lowest to the highest aircraft weight. This means almost a
four-fold increase in relative loudness or annoyance. Combined
with the 9EPNdB increase allowed at the lateral point, which
defines the "width" of the takeoff noise contour, this equals a
four-fold increase in noise footprint area.
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Table 2. Maximum and Minimum Noise Margins (EPNdB) of
Chapter 3 Types encompassing Weight Range of
Recertificated Types
Aircraft and Max. Takeoff
Engine Type Weight Range Mi/Max Chapter 3 Compliance Margins
Tonnes Lateral Flyover Approach Cumulative*
Min/Max Avge
BAe146 37.3-46.0 4.2 6.6 0.3 15.6
ALF500 7.7 10.9 3.2 20.2
F100 47.1-49.9 4.1 2.7 5.4 13.4 13.9
Tay 6.2 3.7 6.6 14.3
MD80/83/87 56.7-74.4 -0.9 -1.0 6.7 6.5 9.2
JT8D-200 2.0 5.9 7.3 11.9
MD90 65.9-75.4 5.9 9.0 8.7 23.6 24.6
V2500 7.3 10.1 8.3 25.7
B737-3/4/500 60.2-76.8 3.4 1.8 -0.2 2.2 6.0
CFM56 7.1 4.9 0.0 9.7
A319/20/21 58.0-78.0 1.7 1.7 4.4 8.8 13.0
CFM56 4.1 5.9 6.2 17.3
B737-6/7/800 52.6-79.0 1.7 4.1 3.6 10.8 14.7
CFM56 6.7 9.1 4.8 18.7
B757-200 99.8-115.9 3.5 7.3 6.5 12.2 17.1
RB211-535E4 5.4 11.9 6.8 22.1
B767-200/ER 127.0-181.4 3.8 3.3 6.7 17.9 19.9
CF6-80C 6.3 11.3 7.4 21.9
* The cumulative values are the minimum and maximum margins of one of the recertificated
weights in the total range and do not necessarily correspond to the sum of individual minimum
and maximum values shown separately above for the three Reference conditions (Lateral,
Flyover and Approach).
Source: Smith, supra note 43, at 17-18.
The departure noise usually has been the major source of
complaints around airports. In the certification context, depar-
ture noise is reflected by the combination of the Lateral and
Flyover conditions, which define the length and width of the
noise footprint. Table 3 ranks hushkitted and Chapter 3 aircraft
of the same broad weight range according to their compliance
margins. According to this table, there is a clear dividing line
between the "worst" Chapter 3 aircraft fitted with high bypass
engines and the "best" of the hushkitted types at Lateral and
Flyover. More than half the hushkitted aircraft exceed the cu-
mulative Lateral and Flyover limits and even the "best" hushkit-
ted type only achieve a 2.5 dB cumulative margin. The MD80,
however, with its low bypass engines, falls amongst the hushkit-
ted types.
In addition, the conditions of everyday operations are very dif-
ferent from the conditions during the certification process. In-
deed, most daily operations are at less than maximum
certificated takeoff weight and utilize reduced takeoff thrust
HUSHKIT PROBLEM




Takeoff (Lateral + Flyover)
Aircraft Type Weight Range Hushkit Departure 
Compliance Margin
Tonnes Min-Max Average
MD90 66 - 75 None 15.8 - 16.3 16.0
BAe146 37 - 46 None 10.8 - 17.6 14.2
B767-200/ER 159 - 181 None 10.8 - 15.1 12.9
B757-200 100 - 116 None 11.2 - 13.8 12.5
DC8-71/2/3 149 - 161 Reengined 12.1 - 12.5 12.3
B737-6/7/8 53 - 79 None 7.7 - 13.1 10.4
B737-3/4/5 60 - 76 None 7.3 - 12.4 9.8
F100 47 - 49 None 7.8 - 9.9 8.8
B727-Tay 77 Reengined 7.2 7.2
A319/20/21 58 - 78 None 4.4 - 10.0 7.2
B737-200 47 - 54 Nordam 1.0 - 4.0 2.5
MD80/83/87 64 - 74 None -0.2 - 5.2 2.5
B727-200RE 86 - 92 Valsan -0.8 - 3.9 1.6
B727-100 72 - 76 Fedex -0.1 - 2.3 1.1
B737-200Adv 44 - 57 Nordam -3.8 - 5.7 1.0
BAC/
DC8-62 152 - 160 MGM -1.7 - 0.4 -0.6
B727-200 77 - 81 Fedex -2.8 - 1.1 -0.8
DC9-10/30 41 - 46 ABS -3.2 - -0.7 -1.9
B737-200/A 53 - 53 AvAero -3.0 - -2.1 -2.5
B727-200 70 - 87 Fedex -3.3 - -2.2 -2.7
Source: Smith, supra note 43, at 18-19.
(the so-called "de-rating") during initial climb to 1000 to 1500ft.
This generates less noise than in certification compliance-dem-
onstration. Recertificated aircraft already have to limit maxi-
mum takeoff weight in the certification process to achieve
Chapter 3 compliance and accordingly cannot take full benefit
from this de-rating in operation.
After the initial climb phase, power "cutback" is normally initi-
ated to normal climb power rating to conserve engine life. To
demonstrate minimum noise possible on flyover, a very high de-
gree of cutback is permitted. Because the jet noise of low bypass
hushkitted aircraft is so much louder, the value of cutback is
considerably more than with a turbofan. Since this cutback is
rarely used in everyday operations, recertificated aircraft lose
the large noise benefit available from this procedure. In the
context of noise impact on the community, the realities of oper-
ational practices widen the gap between Chapter 3 and recertifi-
cated types even further.
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b. The Legitimacy of a Bypass Ratio of Three
Modern high turbofans incorporate the results of 30 years of
noise research. Some of these newly discovered technologies
can be applied to older engine types, particularly to sources gen-
erated within the engine. But the need for a low jet exhaust
velocity makes a significant lowering of the overall noise of low
bypass jets almost impossible.
Engines with a BPR of 0 to 1 could not satisfy the original
Chapter 2 standards (without hushkitting), nor could those with
a BPR below 2 satisfy the Chapter 3 standard.116 The latter in-
cluded the Boeing 727s, the early Boeing 737s, the DC9s, the
F28, and the BAC1-1 1. Airplanes that satisfy Chapter 3 from the
outset have BPRs ranging from 4 to 6, while the latest engines
are closer to 10. At full power, this means that the jet noise
improvement over earlier types of engines has been around 15
to 20 dB, even with increased engine size.
According to the study, the point on the bypass ratio where
noticeable improvements become apparent is a minimum of two
and probably closer to three. In order to decide whether the
dividing line between "quiet" and noisy" aircraft lies at a BPR of
2 or 3, aircraft with the JT8D-200 series are compared with air-
craft equipped with a Rolls Royce Tay engine. The only two
commercial aircraft originally installed with these engines are
the MD80 series developed from the DC9 and the F100 devel-
oped from the F28. It should be remembered that the MD80 is
considerably heavier than the F100 and permitted to make more
noise under Chapter 3.
Table 4. Noise margins (EPNdB) of F100 against MD80 series
Aircraft Maximum Chapter 3 Compliance Margins
Takeoff Weight Lateral Flyover Approach Cumulative
Tonnes (L) (F) (A) L+F+A L + F
F100 49.9 4.1 3.7 5.6 13.4 7.8
MD80 74.4 0.7 -1.0 6.8 6.5 -0.3
MD83 73.5 -0.3 0.1 6.8 6.5 -0.2
MD87 67.8 -0.6 2.5 6.9 8.8 1.9
Source: Smith, supra note 43, at 12.
When looking at the key combined departure noise indicators
of Lateral and Flyover, the differences are striking. To comply




with Chapter 3, the MD80 series rely on a margin at Approach
to offset excesses at one of the two critical departure conditions.
On departure, the MD80 and the MD83 exceed the cumulative
limits. The lighter MD87 has less than a two-decibel margin
while the F100 has almost eight.
This comparison and the examination of the noise data for
Chapter 3 in Tables 2 and 3 (see above), where the "departure"
cumulative margins are between 8 and 16EPNdB, lead to the
conclusion that the dividing line between acceptable and unac-
ceptable from the community standpoint is nearer the 8dB mar-
gin of the F100 than the near-zero margin of the MD80 series.
This in turn puts the dividing line closer to BPR of 3 than 2.
This conclusion is also supported when examining the only
two complete reengining projects that resulted from noise con-
straints. The first reengining project replaced the JT3D engines
in the DC8-70 series with CFM56s. The second was the Alenia
reengining of the UPS B727-100 with Tay engines. Their per-
formance against the Chapter 3 standard is summarized below.
Table 5. Noise margins (EPNdB) for DC8-70 series and B727-
100UPS, reengined with turbofans
Aircraft Maximum Chapter 3 Compliance Margins
Takeoff Weight Lateral Flyover Approach Cumulative
Tonnes (L) (F) (A) L+F+A L + F
DC8-71 149 6.5 6.0 4.3 16.8 12.5
DC8-72 159 6.8 5.7 4.9 17.4 12.5
DC8-73 161 6.8 5.3 4.8 16.9 12.1
B727-100 UPS 77 4.6 2.6 5.4 12.6 7.2
Source: supra note 43, at 13.
The improved noise performance of aircraft reengined with
the above-mentioned turbofans is clear, especially when com-
pared with the hushkitted aircraft listed in Table 1. In addition,
Table 3 provides an across-the-board comparison of all the rele-
vant aircraft, in particular Chapter 3 aircraft, partially and fully
reengined aircraft and hushkitted aircraft. The dashed line in-
dicates the boundary between aircraft with engines of less than
BPR of 2 and greater than 3.
c. Fuel Consumption and Exhaust Emissions
Although hushkits incorporating new engines or improved
performance features may well improve fuel consumption, the
real comparison should be made with modern aircraft that
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would have replaced the Chapter 2 aircraft had they been re-
tired by 2000 in the U.S. and by April 1, 2002, in the EU. Ac-
cordingly, arguments claiming that retaining or marginally
improving fuel consumption of older aircraft ignore the fact
that each newly developed aircraft design is fundamentally bet-
ter than its predecessor.
The same rationale extends into the issue of engine exhaust
emissions. The most important products of combustion that
have an impact on the environment are oxides of nitrogen
(NOx) and carbon dioxide (C0 2), while others receiving atten-
tion are carbon monoxide (CO), water (H 20), unburned hydro-
carbons (UHC), and visible carbon particles (smoke).
With respect to the emission of NOx, modern engines of the
same size category as those used on hushkitted aircraft are much
more advanced in NOx control than the earlier designs. For
example, the JT8D-200 series, used as a replacement for earlier
JT8D engines in some of the recertificated aircraft, produces
50% or more NOx than engines like the CFM56 in Boeing and
Airbus aircraft and the BR700 series destined for the latest
DC9/MD80 variant, the B717. These modern engines comply
with the latest Annex 16 proposals of CAEP/4 whereas the older
types only satisfy the 1985 standards. With regard to other en-
gine exhaust emissions, the situation is similar.
These results again have been confirmed by an article pub-
lished in the ICAO Journal of July/August 1998. According to
this article, modern aircraft have significantly lower emissions
than older aircraft. Emissions from such modern aircraft can
contain up to 50 percent less carbon dioxide, 70 percent less
carbon monoxide, and 90 percent fewer unburned hydrocar-
bons. 117 The article supports this conclusion with data provided
by Lufthansa, which compares the level of emissions by aircraft
type and engines.
d. Conclusion
The above-mentioned results clearly show that the full bene-
fits resulting from the progressive phase-out of Chapter 2 air-
craft over the past two decades will be jeopardized by any
extension of the operational lives of low bypass aircraft via
hushkitting and recertification.
117 SeeJane Hupe, CAEP/4 May Be a Turning Point in ICAO's Work in Environmen-
tal Protection, 53 ICAO JouRNAL, July/Aug. 1998, at 7.
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2. A Review of the Raisbeck Modification"'
Airports Council International North America ("ACI-North
America") conducted a study on the Raisbeck Engineering
Stage 3 modification kit for Boeing 727-200 aircraft equipped
with the JT8D-15 engine. The study compares the noise im-
provements of the Raisbeck modification with an original Chap-
ter 2 Boeing 727 and with a Fedex Hushkit 727. It references
little to the original Stage 3 certificated Boeing 757.
The Raisbeck modification achieves a 12% thrust reduction
from the takeoff thrust level of the JT8D-1 5 engine by reducing
the gross weight and modifying the flap settings. On a Boeing
727-200 with JT8D-15 engines, a 12% thrust decrease equals a
reduction of about 1600 pounds of takeoff thrust, which in turn
correlates to a noise reduction of about 3 to 4 dB." 9 "By using
the approach noise trade-off allowed under FAR Part 36, these
modifications allow the aircraft ... to meet the Stage 3 limits. 120
FAR Part 36 certification limits aircraft takeoff, landing, and
sideline noise at three specific monitoring locations-one for
each measurement. For takeoff, this point is 3.5 nautical miles
from break release.
One study compares the Raisbeck modified aircraft to the
standard Boeing 727-200 with JT8D-15 engines at a comparable
takeoff weight.121
Although the Raisbeck aircraft is somewhat quieter than the
unmodified Boeing 727 on the runway sideline and on takeoff,
the noise improvement is only noticed close to the runway. At
greater distances, the Raisbeck aircraft is similar to the unmodi-
fied aircraft. Although the 727-200 equipped with the FedEx
hushkit is distinctively quieter on takeoff, it still does not com-
pare with the noise footprint of the Boeing 757.122
The study concludes that, although the Raisbeck Stage 3 kit is
a cost-effective solution to achieve Stage 3 compliance under
FAR 36, the real benefits to the Community remain limited.
The Raisbeck modification does not provide significant noise re-
ductions beyond the extent of the measurement points specified
118 This chapter is based on a study by ACI-North America, in which the
benefits of the Raisbeck modification were examined. See, ACI-North America, A




121 See infra Annex A.
122 See id.
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in FAR Part 36, and probably only has a discernable effect on
communities within one mile of the end of the runway protec-
tion zone.'23
III. NOISE POLLUTION AROUND EU AND
U.S. AIRPORTS
A. THE CASES OF SALZBURG AIRPORT AND AMSTERDAM
AIRPORT SCHIPHOL
The future growth of civil aviation in Europe depends upon
the ability of the aviation industry to reduce the current aircraft
noise levels. The provision of sufficient capacity at European
airports is of equal importance to U.S. as to European carriers.
Hushkitted Chapter 2 aircraft have a significantly worse noise
performance than the new improved aircraft certificated to
Chapter 3 standards. According to ACI-Europe, 124 a 12% in-
crease in the number of hushkitted aircraft equals a 50% in-
crease in noise contour therefore disproportionately increasing
the cumulative noise load around airports. The case of Salzburg
Airport and Amsterdam Airport Schiphol clearly illustrate this.
1. Salzburg Airport
Salzburg Airport, a typical regional European airport, allowed
only aircraft meeting Chapter 3 as early as 1991. The City of
Salzburg's Environmental Department conducted a study based
on noise data from the airport's monitoring system.1 2 5 This
study showed that between 1988 and 1995 the noise level
around the airport decreased from 66dB to 59dB despite an in-
crease in aircraft movements from 11,002 to 23,563.126 Despite a
114% increase in air movements since 1988, annual noise levels
have decreased by 80%.127
Another study conducted at the airport revealed that 356
takeoffs of hushkitted aircraft (one daily departure) produced
the same noise levels as the current 25,000 commercial move-
123 See id.
124 ACI Europe represents the interests of over 210 airport operators with
some 450 airports in 48 countries stretching from Portugal to the far east of Rus-
sia accounting for over 90% of commercial air traffic in Europe. See members
link at <http://www.aci-europe.org>.






ments. That means that one hushkit equals sixty-eight normal
Chapter 3 movements. 128
The Salzburg's Environmental Department also compared air-
craft types by the noise energy they emit, based on the airport's
noise monitoring system. Taking the noisiest Chapter 3 aircraft
operating in Salzburg (the MD80), two Airbus A310s, five Boe-
ing 757s, ten Fokker 100s, forty Dash 8s, or fifty Canadian Re-
gional Jets can take off instead of one MD80.129 This means that
Salzburg Airport could triple its movements with low-noise air-
craft without increasing the noise impact.130 Hushkitted aircraft
generate noise levels for exceeding noise levels of Chapter 3 air-
craft. One hushkitted Boeing 727 creates the same noise energy
as three Boeing 767s or eight A320s or twenty Fokker 70s or
forty Canadian Regional Jets. l3 ' In addition, the hushkitted air-
craft's sound characteristics and its weak climb performance
cause complaints from areas of up to 10 km, where the airport
normally receives no negative reactions. 132 The fact that
hushkitted aircraft fly about 1000 feet lower on their departure
route than normal Chapter 3 aircraft forms one of the reasons
for these complaints. 133
2. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol3
In the Netherlands, the level of noise caused by aircraft is
measured in Kosten units (Ke) .13 These can be plotted on a
map and joined up to produce noise contours showing areas
that receive the same amount of noise. The effective capacity of
Amsterdam's Airport Schiphol ("Schiphol") is restricted by two
legal noise zones, which cannot be exceeded at any point or in
any year.'3 6 The most restrictive in the sense of annual capacity
is the present 35 Ke noise zone that restricts the overall noise
impact by flying aircraft during a twelve-month period. Because
noise nuisance is confined to the area within the 35 Ke contour,







134 See Eric de Boer, Relative Noise Capacity Consumption of Hushkitted Aircraft at
Schiphol Airport, Oct. 3, 1999.
135 Kosten Noise Capacity: named after Dutch Professor Kosten who developed
formulas to calculate aircraft noise.
136 See de Boer, supra note 134.
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bounded by the 30 Ke contour (roughly comparable with LAeq
134=55 dB). Within this area, the construction of new housing
is prohibited. 137 Because this noise limitation system is very hard
to comply with in practice, it inhibits all further growth in the
number of aircraft movements, unless it is compensated by a re-
duction in average noise level per aircraft movement.
To comply with these noise limitations, Schiphol actively en-
couraged carriers to replace the noisiest Chapter 2 aircraft with
quieter aircraft. In March 1999, Chapter 2 flights only ac-
counted for less than 1% of all commercial flights. To accom-
modate further air traffic growth, however, Schiphol continues
to discourage the use of noisy aircraft and tries to stimulate the
use of modern Chapter 3 aircraft. The proliferation of hushkit-
ted aircraft would undermine this policy because it would effec-
tively reduce Schiphol's annual capacity. In order to prove their
claim, Schiphol airport calculated the "noise capacity exchange
rate" between some hushkitted ex-Chapter 2 aircraft and some
equivalent modern first-time certificated Chapter 3 aircraft.
Table 6. Noise capacity exchange rate for Recertificated
aircraft against Chapter 3 aircraft
Hushkitted type DC9-30 B727-200 B737-200
Average cumulative margin over 3
measurement points (EPNdB) 0.2 0.97 1.62
Equivalent modern quiet type F100 A321 B737-500
Average cumulative margin over 3
measurement points (EPNdB) 13.9 13.3 9.45
Exchange ratio - in Kosten noise
rating 2.0 1.9 1.5
Exchange ratio - in LAeq rating
system 2.9 2.6 1.8
Source: de Boer, supra note 134.
These tables mean that, in terms of "Kosten noise capacity,"
each flight with a hushkitted DC9-30 uses up as much available




craft like the F100. In terms of "LAeq noise capacity" the
equivalent is nearly three (2.9) F100 flights.
The comparison was made with equivalent aircraft types that
are now in widespread use and that are not even the quietest in
their class at the moment. The exchange ratios with the most
modem "state of the art" aircraft types would even be higher.
B. NOISE PROBLEMS AT U.S. AIRPORTS
United States airports have recognized the urgent need for a
complete phase-out of Chapter 2 aircraft, including hushkitted
or otherwise recertificated types. David Z. Plavin, President of
ACI-North America, 138 shares the EU's conviction that acousti-
cally modified aircraft do not produce the large reductions in
community noise levels as was expected and likely will anger res-
idents living near airports once they realize that an all Stage 3
fleet will only marginally reduce the noise levels in their commu-
nities. Moreover, the community noise impacts probably will
worsen as a result of the expected growth in air travel. 139 There-
fore, he strongly supports developing a Stage 4 standard within
CAEP/5.140
In addition, some U.S. airlines recognize the need to update
their fleet with newer and less noisy aircraft. US Airways is ex-
pected to replace old Boeing 727s and McDonnell Douglas DC-
9s with new Airbus A320s on its East Coast shuttle routes. Ac-
cording to US Airways, the new planes spread their noise over
an area 10 times smaller than their old planes at airports in Bos-
ton and Washington.'4 1 And around New York's La Guardia,
the noise "footprint" is seventeen times smaller. 4 2 According to
Congressman Joe Crowley, who represents residents living near
138 Airports Council International-North America, which spans the United
States and Canada, consists of almost 150 governing bodies owning and operat-
ing airports as well as 325 business providing services and products on which
airports rely.
139 According to Airport Traffic Figures of the Airports Council International,
passenger traffic rose four percent, cargo traffic eight percent, and aircraft move-
ments three percent between August 1998 and August 1999. Overall air trans-
port figures for the first eight months of 1999 reflect continued, steady growth.
See ACI, Airport Traffic Figures Reflect Steady Growth, (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http:/
/www.airports.org/media/mr_19991217.html>.
140 See Hearing on European Union Ban on Aircraft 'Hush-Kits' Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 1999 (Statement of
David Z. Plavin, President of ACI-NA) WL 20011240 (1999).
141 See Planes Getting Quieter; Noise Standard in Effect Jan. 1, CINCINNATI POST,
Dec. 21, 1999, at 7A.
142 See id.
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La Guardia, the hush kits meet "the letter of the law in compli-
ance, but it's not in the spirit of the law, which is to have these
airplanes become more quiet. "143
Residents around U.S. airports increasingly complain about
aircraft noise affecting their residential neighborhoods. Exam-
ples of constant oppositions by residents against airport expan-
sion plans can be found throughout the United States, in
particular in St. Charles, 14 4 Miami, 145 New York, and San
Francisco 46 .
Moreover, the City of Burbank reached an agreement with
the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority whereby the
Airport Authority is allowed to expand the airport in exchange
for a night closure of the building and the fulfillment of some
other conditions.'47 The parties agreed to a "framework settle-
ment" that, among other things, allows the airport to adopt
noise standards that go beyond national minimum standards, in-
cluding an eventual ban on aircraft that meet the Stage 3 noise
requirements via hushkits or re-engining.1 48 Los Angeles Inter-
national (LAX) and Ontario International (ONT) airports also
seem to recognize that Stage 2 aircraft have older engines that
generate more noise and emit more air pollution.149
143 Id.
144 St. Charles Citizens Against Aircraft Noise oppose the city of St. Louis' plans
to expand the airport by adding a runway which will bring the airport closer to St.
Charles and aircraft lower over the city's historic districts, homes, churches, and
schools. They even initiated various lawsuits in state and federal courts. SeeJohn
Sonderegger & Ralph Dummit, St. Charles County Briefs, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 13, 1999, at 1.
145 See Tyler Bridges, Aircraft Noise Still A Problem: Neighbors Complain, But No
Plans Approved, MIAMi HERALD, Apr. 11, 1999, at 1.
146 Angelica Pence, More Houses Near SFO to Get Noise Insulation/Additional $34
Million Approved for Upgrades, SAN FRANcisco CHRON., Feb. 25, 2000.
147 See Kristin S. Krause, Harder than It Sounds, TRAFFIc WORLD, Aug. 9, 1999, at
34; James Baumgarner, U.S. To Charge EC Over Noise Regulation, AVIATION DAILY,
Sept. 10, 1999, at 1.
148 See Burbank Strikes Accord With Airport For New Terminal, WKLY. OF Bus. AVIA-
TION, Aug. 16, 1999, at 76.
149 See Ban on Noisy Stage 2 Aircraft Goes Into Effect Jan. 1 at LAX and Ontario
Airports, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 30, 1999.
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IV. COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU REGULATION WITH
THE AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO
TRADE AND WITH THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TRADE
IN SERVICES
A. AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE
(TBT AGREEMENT) 150
Among various agreements attached to the Agreement Creat-
ing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Charter"), the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement") exerts




Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement contains a Most-Favored-
Nation and a National Treatment obligation. The Article specif-
ically provides that: "Members shall ensure that in respect of
technical regulations, products imported from the territory of
any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin and to
like products originating in any other country."'5 2
This Article prohibits discrimination between like products
on the basis of origin. For the purpose of this Article, aircraft
registered in the EU and aircraft registered in third countries
are undoubtedly "like" products.
The issue to be examined, accordingly, is whether the Regula-
tion treats aircraft registered in a third country "less favorably"
than similar EU registered aircraft. In that respect, it is useful to
review the measures introduced by the Regulation. 5
150 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/IA II-AIA
to (Dec. 15, 1993), in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994) [hereinafter "TBT
Agreement"].
151 See Seung Wha Chang, GATTing a Green Trade Barrier-Eco-labeling and the
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 31J. WORLD TRADE 137, 139 (1997).
152 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.1, supra note 150.
153 The Regulation subjects aircraft registered in an EU Member State to the
non-addition rule. This rule prohibits Member States from adding recertificated
aircraft to their registers as of May 4, 2000. See Regulation, Art. 3.1, supra note 11,
at 49. Nevertheless, an aircraft registered in any Member State before May 4,
2000, which has been registered in the Community ever since, will not be affected
by the non-addition rule. See Regulation, Art. 3.2, supra note 11, at 49. Addition-
ally, the Regulation introduces a non-operation rule, aimed both at EU and third
country carriers. The non-operation rule prohibits recertificated aircraft from
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The United States opposes the measure because it allows EU
aircraft to be transferred from the register of one Member State
to another after May 4, 2000, without losing its right to operate
after 2002.154 Unlike aircraft registered in the EU, a third coun-
try aircraft that is transferred to the registry of another country
after May 4, 2000, is barred from operating in the Community
after 2002.' Although this difference in treatment might ini-
tially seem discriminatory, it is not discriminatory considering
the EU as a single aviation market. Even if national registers are
maintained for practical and historical purposes, these different
registers constitute de facto one Community register. Accord-
ingly, transfers among national registers within the EU should
not be regarded as transfers affecting the operating rights of the
aircraft concerned.
In conclusion, this measure does not discriminate between
aircraft registered in the Community and aircraft registered in
third countries. Both types of registered aircraft receive equal
treatment. The measure allows all aircraft, regardless of origin,
to continue to operate after 2002 in the EU provided that they
were operating into the EU before 2000 and that they have re-
mained on the same register. 15 6
The nature of a technical standard, such as the one the EU
Regulation enacted, is that like all non-tariff barriers "their ef-
fects are neither immediately visible NOR MEASURABLE. '157
Although the EU did not propose or adopt the Regulation with
the specific purpose of discriminating and/or creating an obsta-
cle to trade, distortions of trade might nonetheless result from
the fact that national standards and technical regulations are
different. 158
operating in the territory of the Community as of April 1, 2002, unless they meet
two conditions. These conditions require an airplane operator to prove (1) that
the plane was on the register of that third country on May 4, 2000, and (2) that it
operated in the Community between April 1, 1995, and May 4, 2000. See Regula-
tion, Art. 3.3, supra note 11, at 49. To put EU aircraft at the same level as third
country aircraft, Article 3.4 imposes the same non-operation obligation on EU
aircraft.
154 See H.R. 661, 106th Cong. (1999).
1-5 See Statement of Council's Reasons, 1998 O.J. (C 404) 5, 5.
156 See Regulation, Art. 3.3, supra note 11, at 49.
157 Nusbaumer, supra note 101, at 545 (emphasis added).
158 SeeJ.H.J. Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on
Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 5, 7 (1982).
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Therefore, the question remains, under the ambit of Article
2.2 of the TBT Agreement, whether this facially neutral measure
creates an unnecessary obstacle to trade or constitutes a case of
disguised discrimination.
2. Article 2.2
Article 2.2, a core provision of the TBT Agreement, states
that:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not pre-
pared, adopted or applied with a view or with the effect of creat-
ing unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of
the risks non-fulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives
are, inter alia, national security requirements; the prevention of
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal
or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such
risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia, available
scientific and technical information, related processing technol-
ogy or intended end uses of products.1 59
To be compatible with the TBT Agreement and GATT, a techni-
cal regulation should not create an unnecessary obstacle to in-
ternational trade.
The United States claims that the Regulation creates an obsta-
cle to trade because it harms the U.S. aviation industry. The
United States, however, has failed so far to provide sufficient evi-
dence that demonstrates the claimed two billion dollar eco-
nomic impact of the measure. Most hushkitted aircraft, such as
Boeing 727s and DC9s, do not operate transatlantic routes.16 If
they do, these carriers are on the U.S. register before May 4,
2000, and are operating in the Community before that same
date. Therefore, the measure will not affect them. The EU
measure solely prevents the United States from adding more
hushkitted aircraft on these routes.
In addition, the Regulation has only a limited impact on the
resale market of older aircraft because these aircraft in any
event at or close to the end of their economic life. The Regula-
tion does not prevent U.S. carriers from reselling these aircraft
to third countries. The measure merely prevents these third
159 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.2, supra note 150.
16 See Alan Yonan, Jr. U.S. to File Complaint Over EU's Airplane "Hush Kit" Ban,
DowJONES NEws SERV., Jan. 13, 2000.
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countries from operating these older aircraft in the European
Community. Since more than 85% of the U.S. fleet are short to
medium haul aircraft, the majority of U.S. aircraft are not tech-
nically eligible to operate between places such as Southern Af-
rica and Europe. 161
In addition, the United States still needs to either establish
protectionist intent or prove that the measure exceeds what is
"necessary."
a. Protectionist Intent or Effect
To determine whether the Regulation has a protectionist in-
tent or effect, the definition of the targeted aircraft needs to be
examined.
"Recertificated aircraft" includes hushkitted aircraft and air-
craft that have undergone operational restrictions (weight re-
strictions or reduced flap setting) to meet the Chapter 3
standard. It excludes reengined aircraft, except when the re-
placement engine has a bypass ratio lower than three.
The United States claims that the measure will detrimentally
affect U.S. carriers because more U.S. carriers have aircraft that
fall within the recertificated category than EU carriers. More
U.S. carriers have invested in hushkit technology than their EU
counterparts. In addition, U.S. engine manufacturers produce
most engines installed in older aircraft having a bypass ratio of
less than three.
The European Union, on the other hand, asserts that there is
no protectionist intent behind the adoption of the measure.
The EU's sole motivations are environmental and human health
concerns. 6 2 The EU maintains that the methodology used to
distinguish between aircraft covered by the Regulation is based
on sound technical data, collected on the basis of an independ-
ent study. These data concerning the noise certification clearly
demonstrate that the noise level of hushkitted aircraft or aircraft
with low bypass ratio engines is, weight for weight, considerably
more damaging to the environment than aircraft originally cer-
tificated to conform with Chapter 3.
161 See websites of several U.S. carriers (such as <http://www.aa.com/>, <http:/
/www.delta-air.com>, <http://www.ual.com>, <http://www.usair.com>) and air-
craft manufacturers (such as <http://www.boeing.com/commercial> and <http:/
/www.airbus.com>).
162 See Information Pack, supra note 71, at 5.
368
HUSHKIT PROBLEM
Moreover, the United States doubts the usefulness of a bypass
ratio of three to distinguish between aircraft targeted by the
Regulation. It alleges that the EU chose a bypass ratio of three
only or primarily to exclude U.S. manufactured engines from
the permitted reengining process. The United States claims
that the European producers manufacture most high bypass en-
gines, which may be used to reengine older aircraft. To answer
these allegations, the EU uses scientific evidence to prove the
usefulness of a bypass ratio of three in deciding which aircraft
should be prevented from being registered and operated in the
European Community.163
The bypass ratio of three is based on real performance only
and focuses on aircraft having proportionally a significant detri-
mental effect on the noise level at EU airports. In addition, Fed-
eral Aviation Regulation FAR 36, as amended by Amendment 7
of 1977, also recognized the usefulness of a bypass ratio of
three.1 6 4
The technical experts with the United States, however, contest
the validity of the EU's evidence. First, they assert that the
hushkitted aircraft are situated around the ICAO Chapter 3
noise limit because U.S. carriers decided to hushkit their older
aircraft only to the extent necessary to conform to the Chapter 3
noise standards. Secondly, the findings that U.S. experts used in
Annex B165 suggest that many aircraft with a high bypass ratio
suffer from a worse noise performance than some aircraft with
lower bypass ratios.
These results are only superficially contradictory. The air-
planes that the U.S. report used are all aircraft with a bypass
ratio of more than three. The United States fails to mention
that these aircraft still have a significantly better noise perform-
ance than hushkitted aircraft even if some of them do not have
the best noise performance. Additionally, the issue here is not
to determine the noisiness of these high bypass ratio aircraft but
to see whether the criteria of a bypass ratio of 3 is justified. Ac-
cording to the data provided in Table 3, which is not contradic-
tory to the data provided by the United States in Annex B, the
use of a bypass ratio of three to distinguish aircraft seems fully
justified. Therefore, one may reasonably conclude that the defi-
163 See supra Part II. B.l.b.
164 See 14 C.F.R. § 36.7, amended by 42 FR 12371, Mar. 3, 1977.
165 See infra, Annex B.
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nition of recertificated aircraft is based on sound scientific and
technical data and has no protectionist intent or effect.
b. Measure Should not Create an "Unnecessary" Obstacle to
Trade and Should Not Be More Trade-Restrictive
than Necessary to Fulfill a Legitimate Objective
As discussed above, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement in-
cludes the protection of the environment as a legitimate objec-
tive. Because excessive aircraft noise is recognized as a severe
environmental problem, the avoidance of such further noise
pollution should be considered as a legitimate environmental
concern. The second issue then is whether the measure is more
trade-restrictive than is necessary to fulfill the legitimate con-
cern of environmental protection or, in other words, whether
the EU could have adopted an alternative measure with less im-
pact upon international air transport.
The European Union's Regulation merely avoids future noise
level increases at Community airports. Indeed, recertificated
aircraft operating in the European Community before May 4,
2000, will still be allowed to serve the same Community airports
after April 1, 2002. The measure merely prevents EU Member
States from adding additional recertificated aircraft to its regis-
ters. Likewise, recertificated aircraft registered in third coun-
tries after May 4, 2000, will be denied access to the territory of
the Community.166
By freezing the existing noise levels, the EU has chosen the
least trade-restrictive measure in order to prevent further noise
pollution and to enhance the protection of a legitimate environ-
mental concern.
c. Risks
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement mandates that WTO mem-
bers to take into account the risks of the non-fulfillment of a
legitimate objective, including the protection of human health
and of the environment. 167 It also enumerates the factors to as-
sess these risks, including available scientific and technical infor-
mation, related processing technology, and intended end-uses
of products.
The EU's reluctance to implement the measure could clearly
entail serious risks not only to human health and the environ-
166 See Regulation, Art. 3.2, supra note 11, at. 49.
167 See TBT Agreement, Art. 2.2, supra note 150.
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ment, but also to the European aviation market as a single eco-
nomic entity.
Noise from aircraft causes mental distress and affects human's
tolerance levels.' 6s As air traffic becomes denser and airport
congestion steadily increases, the risk that noise disturbance by
aircraft movements will cause more devastating consequences to
human health and the environment is inevitable. In addition, if
the EU failed to take the measure, airports would likely impose
unilateral "curfews,"' 69 threatening the integrity of the Euro-
pean single aviation market.
It is arguable that there would be no violation of ICAO stan-
dards were individual airports to implement rules that, for ex-
ample, limited hushkitted aircraft to only day time hours or
assessed fees on hushkitted aircraft much higher, perhaps even
prohibitively higher, than on other aircraft. Were the U.S. to
press its complaint, therefore, a successful outcome for the U.S.
could well amount to a Pyrrhic victory, with the implementation
of outright bans by individual airports throughout the EU. In
addition, the U.S. has many airportslV°-indeed, the entire State
of Hawaiia' 7 -that have adopted noise prohibition on aircraft
that arguably run afoul of ICAO's minimum requirements. Can
the U.S. argue that these individual U.S. airport prohibitions are
legal but comparable prohibitions by European airports not?
d. Conclusion
The EU Regulation does not create an obstacle to trade for
U.S. carriers. The evidence the U.S. government advanced to
prove the alleged economic impact of more than two billion dol-
lars on the U.S. aviation industry is not at all persuasive. No
facts or data have been produced that would support any dam-
ages much less damages of $2 billion. Nor has the United States
168 See Goh, supra note 63, at 280-81.
169 See supra Part I.C.2.a. for examples of unilateral action taken by several gov-
ernments throughout the EU.
170 See supra, Part III.B.
171 In 1990, the U.S. Congress adopted 49 U.S.C. § 47528, prohibiting all U.S.
and foreign airlines from operating more Stage 2 aircraft into Hawaii than they
operated into Hawaii on November 5, 1990. This law was used at least once to
preclude a new foreign carrier from flying into Hawaii using Stage 2 aircraft. In
1996, Orient Avia, a designated carrier from Russia, obtained DOT authority to
operate Vladivostok-Hawaii, but was precluded because of the Congressional
prohibition. See DOT Grants Orient Avia's Bid for Russia-Hawaii service, AVIA-
TION DAILY, May 17, 1996; see also Russia's Orient Avia Still Eyes U.S. Service,
AVIATION DAILY AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 24, 1997.
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produced any evidence as to the alleged detrimental effect on
U.S. carriers were the Regulation adopted. Moreover, the Regu-
lation's alleged impact on the resale market of aging U.S. air-
craft carriers is not certain considering that most of these
aircraft are close to or at the end of their economic life.
Even if the Regulation creates an obstacle to trade, Article 2.2
requires that a measure must have either a protectionist intent
or effect, or that it went beyond what is necessary. Given the
impetus from environmental groups for the adoption of this
Regulation and considering that the Regulation's coverage as
well as the non-addition and non-operation rule are based on
sound technical data, the EU Regulation does not reveal any
protectionist intent or effect. In addition, the EU Regulation
does not introduce a flat ban, but merely freezes the existing
noise level around Community airports, thus opting for the least
trade-restrictive measure.
3. Article 2.4
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO members to
base their regulations as much as possible on international stan-
dards. Article 2.4 specifically provides:
Where technical regulations are required and relevant interna-
tional standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members
shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their
technical regulations except when such international standards
or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means
for the fulfillment [sic] of the legitimate objectives pursued, for
instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors
or fundamental technological problems.'72
a. The Role and Force of Standards
The Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that
ICAO develops in the operational or technical field are only rec-
ommendations. It has been argued that SARPs do not bind con-
tracting Parties. In fact, parties can contradict SARPs when
necessary. 173 The incorporation of ICAO standards in Commu-
nity legislation enhances the effectiveness of these standards. 7 1
172 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.4, supra note 150.
173 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAw-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIA-
TION ORGANIZATION, 77-78 (1969).
174 See Goh, supra note 63, at 285.
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Moreover, ICAO standards are minimum standards. Con-
tracting parties increasingly find them as insufficient to address
the safety and well-being of other citizens. 75 Article 1.2 of Part
II of Volume I of Annex 16 provides that the State of Registry
shall grant or validate a noise certification if satisfactory evi-
dence is provided that the aircraft complies with requirements
that are at least equal to the standards contained in Annex 16.
Accordingly, this language implicitly but clearly indicates the
"minimal" nature of these standards and seems arguably to allow
Contracting States to adopt more stringent standards.
Even if the United States complies with the minimum stan-
dards Annex 16 sets forth, the EU could nonetheless still unilat-
erally impose stricter standards if the health and well-being of
European citizens required it to do so.
b. The Compatibility of the Regulation with International
Standards
The EU Regulation is not contrary to the international stan-
dards set by the ICAO. The Regulation does not introduce a
new noise standard nor modify the current Chapter 3 standard,
since it is nothing more than an operational rule aimed at
preventing noise pollution increase from recertificated aircraft
at European airports. Chapter 3 does not cover operational
noise limits around airports. On the contrary, it merely sets
forth noise measurement standards for aircraft for which the ap-
plication for a certificate of airworthiness for the prototype was
accepted on or after October 6, 1977.176 The Regulation limits
operations in the European Community and prevents the addi-
tion of recertificated aircraft on European registers. Therefore,
it does not affect the ICAO certification rules or the Chapter 3
standard.
Even if the Regulation is contrary to the existing Chapter 3
standard, the Regulation is nevertheless justified under Article
2.4 of the TBT Agreement. First, the language used in Article
2.4 clearly indicates that the drafters of this provision wanted to
avoid a watertight obligation to use international standards. 77
The provision thus leaves some room for WTO members to
adopt stricter standards.
175 See Mendes de Leon, supra note 83, at 131.
176 See id.
177 See Nusbaumer, supra note 101, at 545.
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Second, because the ICAO adopted the Chapter 3 standard
more than 20 years ago (1977), this standard no longer reflects
recent developments in engine technology or the exponential
increase in air traffic volume. The EU believes the Chapter 3
standard is "ineffective or inappropriate" to avoid further envi-
ronmental degradation from increasing noise pollution from
aircraft movements. The establishment of a stricter standard in
the Regulation, by freezing the existing noise levels, is justified
under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
As mentioned above, even if hushkits reduce some noise,
hushkitted aircraft remain much noisier than aircraft equipped
with new technology engines. 78 They also emit more pollutants
than modern aircraft. 179
The Regulation does not discriminate against foreign airlines
or manufacturers' 80 since EU airlines are equally prevented
from using hushkitted aircraft and EU manufacturers of non-
compliant engines are equally affected.18 ' The hushkit rule af-
fects not only U.S. aircraft, such as refitted MD-80s, DC-9s, and
Boeing 727s, but also European aircraft, such as BAG-ilis and
Fokker F-28s.' 82
The complaints from residential neighborhoods surrounding
the airports provided the impetus for environmental groups to
encourage the EU to pass the measure, not the EU aviation
industry. 183
178 See Smith, supra note 43, at 4.
179 See Hupe, supra note 117, at 7.
180 See supra Part IV. A.1 & 2.
1s For example, Omega Air, an Irish manufacturer of hushkits and re-engin-
ing technology. At the end of December, the English High Court ruled against
the EU's non-addition rule for hushkitted aircraft in favor of Omega Air. The
Court ruled that the use of engine bypass ratios instead of noise footprints to bar
aircraft was invalid. The court referred the case to the European Court ofJustice,
which is expected to rule on the validity of the engine bypass ratio standard.
Omega Air is also contesting the validity of the use of bypass ratios directly before
the Court of First Instance of the European Communities and is claiming dam-
ages. In addition, it has begun proceedings against the rule in the Irish High
Court. See English Court Rules Against European Union Ban, AiRPORTS, Jan. 4, 2000.
182 See Christopher Fotos, Transatlantic Battle Looms Over Hushkits; Airports Back
Need For New Controls, AiRPORTS, Sept. 14, 1999, at 380.
183 Examples include: protests against the noise levels at London-Stansted Air-
port and the divided opinions of the local community over the construction of a




The Regulation should especially be examined in light of Arti-
cle 2.8 of the TBT Agreement which states that: "Wherever ap-
propriate, Members shall specify technical regulations based on
product requirements in terms of performance rather than de-
sign or descriptive characteristics."184
This Article contains mild language. The words "wherever ap-
propriate" clearly leave some room for members to base their
technical regulations on design characteristics. Accordingly, the
EU does not deem itself to be violating this Article when it ac-
knowledges that the Regulation is indeed based on design
rather than on performance characteristics.
B. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS)
One of the basic provisions in GATS is the most-favored-na-
tion ("MFN") obligation of Article II. Contrary to the corre-
sponding principle in GATT, however, GATS members may
maintain a MFN-inconsistent measure provided they list such
MFN exemptions upon entry into force of the GATS. The GATS
Annex on Air Transport Services constitutes such an Article II
exemption.185
The Annex on Air Transport Services covers all "measures af-
fecting trade in air transport services, scheduled or non-sched-
uled, and ancillary services" (Section 1 of the Annex). Because
existing obligations under bilateral or multilateral agreements
are "grandfathered,"1 6 the Annex does not achieve any signifi-
cant liberalization of the many bilateral agreements.
Moreover, Section 2 of the Annex explicitly excludes traffic
rights and ancillary services from the scope of the GATS (the so-
called "hard rights"). GATS only applies to aircraft repair and
184 TBT Agreement, Art. 2.8, supra note 150.
185 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Liberalization of International Air Transport Serv-
ices Through the GATS?, in PERSPECFIVES OF AIR LAW, SPACE LAW, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS LAW FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (1996).
186 "Grandfather rights" or the "Existing legislation clause" is a concept intro-
duced in the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and enabled Contracting Parties to maintain existing legisla-
tion inconsistent with Part II (Articles 3 to 23) of GATT. Similarly, Section 1 of
the Annex on Air Transport Services provides: "It is confirmed that any specific
commitment made or obligation assumed under this Agreement shall not reduce
or affect a Member's obligations under bilateral or multilateral agreements that
are in effect at the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO." 33
I.L.M. 44 (1994).
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maintenance services, the selling and marketing of air transport
services, and computer reservation systems (the so-called "soft-
rights") 187
Since the EU Regulation does not deal with any of these three
covered "soft ancillary services," GATS is not applicable to the
measure.
V. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
AND WITH BILATERAL AIR SERVICES
AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN
EU MEMBER STATES AND
THE U.S.
A. DIRECTIVE VERSUS REGULATION
The Council's decision to change the proposed directive into
a regulation is fully justified. Contrary to the opinion of those
who oppose the Regulation, this change was not made to enable
Members States to escape their international obligations under
the bilateral air services agreements with the United States.
In this regard, it is useful to note the differences between a
regulation and a directive. According to Article 249 (ex Article
189) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a reg-
ulation has general application, is binding in its entirety, and is
directly applicable in all Member States. A directive, however, is
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but leaves to the national authori-
ties the choice of form and methods.188
Whether the measure takes the form of a regulation or a di-
rective, in both cases Member States are bound by the substan-
tive obligations of the measure. The difference between these
two Community legislative acts lies herein: to effect the internal
legal order of a Member State, a directive requires a positive act
of implementation, the form of which is left to the individual
Member State's discretion. A regulation, to the contrary, does
not require an act of implementation but, once adopted, di-
rectly effects the internal legal order of a Member State.
This difference is exactly why the Council preferred a regula-
tion. Indeed, the pressing noise problem around airports com-
manded a quick and uniform response. The long
187 Section 3 of the Annex on Air Transport Services, GATS, supra note 42.
188 Article 249 (ex Article 189) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Community, 1997 (C 340) 173.
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implementation process of a Directive would have caused not
only considerable delay, but extensive disuniformity during the
delay period. 18
9
B. COMPATIBILITY WITH CHICAGO CONVENTION
The Regulation should be examined under several Articles of
the Chicago Convention. Article 15 is especially relevant since it
introduces a non-discrimination principle with regard to access
to airports, the use of air navigation facilities, and the charges
related to both. 190 In essence, Article 15 provides that every air-
port in a contracting State that is open to public use by its na-
tional aircraft, should also be open under uniform conditions to
the aircraft of all other contracting Parties. 9 1 Closely related to
Article 15 is Article 44, which provides that the aims and objec-
tives of ICAO are to ensure that the rights of contracting States
are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair
opportunity to operate international airlines.
192
The United States alleges that the Regulation makes these ar-
ticles obsolete since it restricts the access of U.S. carriers to
Community airports and, accordingly, U.S. carriers would no
longer enjoy a fair opportunity to operate international airlines.
As already mentioned under the TBT Agreement, however,
the Regulation applies equally to EU carriers as well as to U.S.
carriers, regardless of the transfer rule. 93 Although this rule
might seem facially discriminatory, it is nonetheless justified in
light of the single European aviation market. Since different na-
tional registers constitute in fact one Community register, trans-
fers between these registers should not affect the operating
rights of Community aircraft. Because the United States alleg-
edly only operates a small number of hushkitted aircraft on
transatlantic routes, the majority of its carriers serving these
transatlantic routes are complying with the Regulation. Accord-
ingly, the Regulation does not discriminate between EU and
U.S. air carriers in terms of access to Community airports or fair
opportunities to operate their international airlines.
189 Interview with Laurent Muschel, Transport Directorate-General, in Brus-
sels, Belgium (Mar. 30, 1999).
190 See Chicago Convention, Art. 15, supra note 5.
191 See id.
192 See Chicago Convention, Art. 44, supra note 5.
19- See supra Part W.A.1.
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In addition, the Chicago Convention "does not prohibit dis-
crimination, but merely considers the avoidance of discrimina-
tion as a goal to be achieved." '194
The United States also claims that the EU Regulation violates
Article 33 of the Chicago Convention. Article 33 requires all EU
Member States to recognize the airworthiness certificates of U.S.
registered aircraft as valid, provided "that the requirements
under which such certificates and licenses were issued or ren-
dered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which
may be established from time to time pursuant to this
Convention.1 95
However, the EU questions the validity of the U.S. certificates
of airworthiness. In particular, the EU contests the methodol-
ogy United States authorities use to recertify hushkitted aircraft.
The noise tests the U.S. uses allegedly differ from those required
by ICAO, although the EU fails to present sufficient evidence in
this regard. In addition, the EU alleges that the United States
allows hushkitted aircraft pass the certification test under condi-
tions which airlines cannot meet or do not respect under daily
normal circumstances. 196 The EU claims that the U.S. authori-
ties use new operational restrictions, like takeoff weight restric-
tions and speed requirements, to ensure that the hushkitted
aircraft meet the Chapter 3 noise standard. The introduction of
such operational restrictions allegedly is contrary to the purpose
of noise certification, which is "to ensure that the latest available
technology is incorporated into the aircraft design.' 97
Article 37 of the Chicago Convention is also important, man-
dating that "[e]ach contracting State undertakes to collaborate
in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regu-
lations ... in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate
and improve air navigation."' 98 This provision is more of a
guideline or recommendation than an obligation imposed upon
contracting States. In addition, as explained above,1 99 the Regu-
194 B.D.K. Henaku, The ICAO CNS/ATM System: New King, New Law?, 19 AIR &
SPACE L. 146, 149 (1994). While the Regulation may have some adverse impacts
on the resale value of certain aging aircraft built and rebuilt by U.S. manufactur-
ers, it may be argued that the provisions of the Chicago Convention apply to air
services, not to the resale value of aircraft.
195 See Chicago Convention, Art. 33, supra note 5.
196 See supra Part II.B.l.a.
197 See Foreword to Volume I of Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention, supra note
5.
198 Chicago Convention Art. 37, supra note 5.
199 See supra Part IV.A.3.
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lation is not contrary to the Chapter 3 noise standard of ICAO
since it constitutes an operational rule, not covered by the ICAO
certification rules.
Moreover, even if the Regulation is contrary to the ICAO stan-
dards, the advisory nature of Article 37 allows for some excep-
tions. This is especially true when an international standard,
such as the Chapter 3 standard, has become an ineffective tool
in avoiding further noise pollution.
C. COMPATIBILITY WITH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
All bilateral air service agreements between the United States
and the EU Member States contain an obligation to give U.S.
carriers a "fair and equal opportunity to compete in interna-
tional air transportation." The U.S. government alleges that the
Regulation deprives their carriers of this fair and equal opportu-
nity to compete. Since this issue has already been addressed suf-
ficiently, reference is made to the relevant chapters.20 0
Most of these bilateral air service agreements also contain the
following important provision:
Neither party shall unilaterally limit the volume of traffic, fre-
quency or regularity of service, or the aircraft type or types oper-
ated by the designated airlines of the other Party, except as may
be required for customs, technical, operational or environmental
reasons under uniform conditions consistent with Article 15 of
the Convention. 0
These agreements thus appear to allow a party to take unilat-
eral action, provided that operational or environmental grounds
justify the action and uniform conditions apply. Even if the Reg-
ulation clearly has a sound environmental justification (the
avoidance of further noise pollution and the protection of
human health) it nonetheless still needs to be determined
whether such a measure is applied under uniform conditions
consistent with the non-discrimination principle of Article 15 of
the Chicago Convention. 2 2 Again, the EU Regulation does not
discriminate between EU and U.S. carriers but applies uniform
operating conditions to both.20 3
200 See supra Part V.B.
201 See Article 11 (3) of the U.S.-Luxembourg Air Transport Agreement, supra
note 106.
202 See Chicago Convention, Art. 15, supra note 5.
203 See supra Part IV.A.1 and Part V.B.
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Accordingly, the EU Regulation does not induce EU Member
States to violate their obligations towards the United States
under the above-mentioned bilateral air services agreements.
VI. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. AMENDMENTS TO THE EU REGULATION
Although the EU Regulation fully complies with the princi-
ples set forth in the TBT Agreement, the Chicago Convention
and the bilateral air services agreements, the EU Regulation
could nonetheless be more consistent with some international
obligations, especially with the TBT Agreement and with the
Chicago Convention, if the following amendments were made.
First, the Regulation would be more consistent with Article 2.8
of the TBT Agreement if it introduced a stricter standard based
on performance characteristics rather than on design character-
istics of aircraft engines. Even if the language of Article 2.8, i.e.
"wherever appropriate," does not impose a strong obligation on
WTO members to base their standards on performance charac-
teristics, this standard is nonetheless clearly preferred since it is
more transparent than design or descriptive standards. Accord-
ingly, the EU Regulation could require aircraft serving Commu-
nity airports to follow stricter noise performance limits than
currently required by Chapter 3 of Volume I of Annex 16 to the
Chicago Convention. In particular, the Regulation could re-
quire aircraft serving EU airports to respect a certain noise level
expressed in X decibel, in accordance with the relative weight of
the aircraft concerned, that is lower than the noise levels al-
lowed under Chapter 3. Therefore, U.S. carriers would be more
likely to meet the stricter performance standards and accord-
ingly, the measure would have less impact upon these carriers.
Additionally, even if the various national registers are re-
garded as one Community register, the EU could allow for more
flexibility towards third country carriers by amending the Regu-
lation's transfer rule. One option would be for the EU to allow
third country aircraft to be transferred from the register of one
third country to another/EU Member State register between
May 4, 2000, and April 1, 2002, without losing the right to oper-
ate in the EU after April 1, 2002, provided that this third coun-
try aircraft operated in the EU before May 4, 2000. A second
option would be that the transfer of aircraft between the regis-
ters of EU Member States after May 4, 2000 would also bar these
aircraft from serving Community airports after 2002. While the
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first option is preferred because it is less contrary to the idea of
the European Community as a single aviation market,20 4 both
solutions would put third country aircraft on a more equal foot-
ing with European carriers and would affect the resale value of
older aircraft less significantly. Accordingly, third country air-
craft would be given a fairer opportunity to compete in the
Community air transport market.
Nevertheless, both solutions can be equally doubted since
they seem to neutralize the environmental rationale of the Reg-
ulation. Indeed, the Regulation's aim is to prevent older air-
craft with higher noise levels from coming into the Community.
If the transfer of older aircraft will not prevent it from serving
Community airports, a greater number of noisy airplanes will
come into the Community after 2002. Accordingly, there will
proportionately be more noise pollution in the vicinity of these
airports.
B. A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTION
At the outset of ICAO, the zoning of airports and residential
areas was viewed as the ideal solution in reducing noise at air-
ports. Later, under the strong impetus of ICAO, the introduc-
tion and development of quieter aircraft was emphasized. In
this context, ICAO adopted Volume I of Annex 16 to the Chi-
cago Convention. This Annex sets out noise emissions stan-
dards, which have gradually developed into stricter standards.
Airport zoning, in conjunction with adopting noise emissions
restrictions, significantly reduced noise pollution around air-
ports in developed countries. However, taking into account the
increased volume of air transport and the introduction of
longer aircraft, the EU viewed it as essential to push for further
noise reduction measures. In that context, and given the unex-
plained reluctance of the United States inside the ICAO forum
to agree on Chapter 4 standards, the EU thought it was neces-
sary to unilaterally adopt stricter standards, hoping to push the
other contracting parties to do the same.
But considering the past difficulties encountered by the con-
tracting parties within CAEP when trying to agree on stricter
noise performance levels and notwithstanding the U.S. govern-
ment's recent apparent willingness to expedite adopting such
stricter noise standards, it is advisable to develop still further the
possibilities offered by compatible land-use planning. The antic-
204 See Interview with Laurent Muschel, supra note 189.
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ipated future growth in the volume of air traffic will lead to a
further increase in noise levels around airports since noise levels
near airports are determined not only by the fleet mix serving
the airport, but also by the number of aircraft movements.
Compatible land-use planning and control is essential in en-
suring that the current noise performance levels of aircraft are
not worsened or offset by further residential developments
around airports. Proper land use planning will prevent an in-
crease in the number of people aircraft noise affects through
limiting inappropriate development. It also avoids unreasona-
ble constraints upon airport capacity and air transport.
205
In addition, as ICAO suggested at the Earth Summit in Rio,
there is a compelling need for adopting an international con-
vention on environmental protection related to civil aircraft. 206
Such an instrument would be preferable since it could specifi-
cally address environmental issues related to civil aviation sepa-
rately and would induce Contracting States to consider this area
of environmental protection as an important matter in the
future.
205 There appears to be some truth to the argument that people are able to
purchase properties close to airports more cheaply in light of the noise factor.
But then, as soon as the number of purchasers reaches some critical mass, they
begin to organize to oppose the very noise factor that made their properties
cheaper to buy. Just as such groups gain political prominence in the U.S., so too
do they in Europe.
206 See Statement from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to
the Fourth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://
www.icao.int/icao/en/env/cop-4.htm>.
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